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INTRODUCTION
Impulse has clashed with reflection throughout the
American history of military commissions. The Framers had a
clear favorite in this fight. Deploring the frequency of treaty
violations and assaults on foreign ambassadors in the Articles of
Confederation period,' they gave Congress authority to "define
and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations"2 to
inspire deliberation that the Articles of Confederation period
had lacked. However, impulse has frequently threatened to
supplant reflection in this exigent realm.
1. Madison cautioned that the Articles encouraged "any indiscreet member to
embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations." See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, 262 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
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In the aftermath of September 11, President Bush
established commissions unilaterally, only to be rebuffed by the
Supreme Court.s While the Obama administration helped
remedy the procedural infirmities that drove the Supreme
Court's decision, the government has returned to impulse's well
in two cases, one pending before the District of Columbia
Circuit and the other just decided, arguing that international
law does not limit military commission jurisdiction over charges
of "material support" to terrorism.4 According to the
government, Congress's war powers5 underwrote the
development of a United States "common law of war" which
renders the Define and Punish Clause superfluous.6 Critics of
the government's view argue, in contrast, that the Define and
Punish Clause precludes the use of military commissions to try
any charges of material support. This Article argues that both
the government and its critics have misread the Framers' intent,
American practice, and the limits of international law.
The problem in the two D.C. Circuit cases, United States v.
Hamdan and United States v. al Bahlul, arises because of the
exceptional breadth of the domestic material support statute,
which bars material support of both terrorist activity and
terrorist groups.7 For reasons that make sense in the domestic
context, the statute bars providing money, services, training, and
expert advice or assistance.8 Providing any amount of money, no
matter how small, to a group such as Hamas designated by the
Secretary of State as a "foreign terrorist organization" violates
the domestic statute. Congress largely imported this broad
prohibition in the Military Commission Acts (MCAs) of 2006
and 2009. While the MCA prohibition is limited to Al Qaeda and
3. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559 (2006).
4. See Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan Il), 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
(reversing United States v. Hamdan (Hamdan 1), 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (Ct. Mil.
Comm'n Rev. 2011)); United States v. al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (Ct. Mil.
Comm'n Rev. 2011).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-14 (governing initiation of hostilities and the
regulation of the armed forces).
6. See Brief for Respondent at 25, Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238 (No. 11-1257) (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Hamdan Brief for the United States], available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Hamdan-Brief-for-US-As-
Filed.pdf.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
8. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010).
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associated forces, it clearly reaches acts such as low-level
financial support that have never been considered violations of
international law.9 Applying the statute to acts committed before
its enactment would trigger a clash with the principle of legality,
inscribed in the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, which
requires that a prospective defendant receive fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is criminal.10 That clash with the
principle of legality dominates appeals of the material support
convictions of Salim Hamdan (Osama bin Laden's former
driver) and Al Qaeda propagandist Ali Hamza al Bahlul.
The scope of military commission jurisdiction over charges
such as material support entails questions far broader than the
two cases now on appeal. These questions involve the role of
international law in the structure of the Constitution and the
United States' options in meeting the continuing threat of
terrorism. Unfortunately, the principal schools of thought on
military commission jurisdiction have not made arguments that
do justice to the stakes involved.
The government's argument that a US common law of war
allows it to bypass the Define and Punish Clause would have
troubled the Framers. The Framers had carefully studied the
early scholars (publicists) of international law such as Vattel,
Grotius, and Pufendorf. They admired the development of
international law, which had helped set the stage for the
constraints favored by the Framers on arbitrary government
authority. Vattel asserted that international law is important
precisely because individual nations display defects in judgment
when left to their own devices." Hamilton, arguing in a New
York court that a state law violated the law of nations, had
viewed compliance with that law as a matter of "national
character."' 2 Edmund Randolph, the first Attorney General,
advised that "every change [in the law of nations] is at the peril
9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7), 950t(25) (2009).
10. See DAVID LUBAN,JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 14-15 (2010).
11. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 137 (London 1797).
12. See Rutgers v. Waddington, Opinion of the New York Mayor's Court, Aug. 27,
1784. There is no official report of the case. Documents from the case are collected in
1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF HAMILTON: DOcUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 284-543 (Julius
Goebel ed., 1964). The opinion of the court is reprinted in id. at 393-419 [hereinafter
LAW PRACTICE].
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of the nation which makes it."1s From the Framers' perspective,
a "US common law of war" would have made as much sense as a
"US law of physics."
Moreover, the overwhelming weight of US practice has
tracked the Framers' concerns. US practice informs the
development of international law without creating a distinctive
body of law that supplants the law of nations. In the Civil War
and World War II, the US tailored prosecutions to conduct such
as sabotage, espionage, and the killing of civilians which has
traditionally been tried in military commissions. To conform to
our allies' reading of international law, American prosecutors at
Nuremberg narrowed the amorphous category of "membership
offenses" to participation in units that specialized in killing
civilians and the knowing provision of substantial financial
support to such groups. The exception to this trend is Andrew
Jackson's First Seminole War military commission trial for an
elderly Scottish trader, Alexander Arbuthnot, a vocal but almost
certainly nonviolent defender of Native American rights.14
Historians have cast Jackson's resort to a military commission as
an outlier, not an example to be followed.'5
If the US common law of war approach fails to persuade, so
does the opposing argument, which I call the categorical
approach. Backers of this theory, including the D.C. Circuit
panel in Hamdan v. United States, have asserted that unless
international bodies have endorsed prosecution of the precise
offense charged in military commissions, the law of nations
provides inadequate authorization under the Define and Punish
Clause.'6 The categorical approach fails to ask whether the test
of jurisdiction should be functional, relying on the conduct at
13. Who Privileged From Arrest, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792).
14. See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission,
46 VA. J. INT'L L. 5, 27-31 (2005) (discussing the legal impact of Jackson's decisions);
J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J.
463, 532-33 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, Global Constitution] (analyzing the incident); see
generally Deborah A. Rosen, Wartime Prisoners and the Rule of Law: Andrew Jackson's
Military Tribunals during the First Seminole War, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 559 (2008)
(interpreting debate in Congress and in popular press).
15. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 590-95.
16. See Hamdan I, 696 F.3d 1238, 1249-52 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Kevin Jon Heller, Why
Hamdan's Material Support Convictions Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, OPINIOJURIS (Aug.
7, 2008, 8:19 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/07/why-hamdans-material-support-
convictions-violate-the-ex-post-facto-lause.
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issue rather than the label that the charge represents. Just as the
US common law of war view narrows US practice to fit its
argument, the categorical approach narrows international
practice. Aiding and abetting liability, for example, is analogous
to a subset of material support charges that entails concrete
assistance to unlawful violence or knowing performance of a
substantial role in violent organizations.
The Framers did not share the categorical approach's
embrace of arbitrary labels. Madison in Federalist No. 37
distinguished law's "course of practice" from science's "perfectly
accurate . . . delineations." 7 The difficulty of codification also
argued for a measure of deference to Congress. In an important
early case on the Define and Punish Clause, Justice Story
observed that international law's resistance to facile formulas led
the Framers to entrust Congress with the "power to define" the
law of nations.'8 The certainty of the categorical approach would
have earned a skeptical rejoinder from the pragmatic Framers.
The categorical approach also ignores the profound
concern that the publicists and Framers had with violent
nonstate actors who defied state authority. Vattel warned against
the dangers of individuals and groups that embroiled states in
war, while Jay attributed wars with Native American nations to
the excesses of border state officials and residents.' 9 Courts have
typically upheld legislation under the Define and Punish Clause
that targets individuals such as pirates and counterfeiters who
threaten America's standing in the world. 20 Terrorists
constructing a haven in one nation as they launch attacks on
another surely fit into the same category of individuals who
threaten international cooperation.
To understand why both sides fall short, I advance a
membership theory of the Define and Punish Clause that relies
on Enlightenment ideas about the psychology of law. I argue
that the Framers drafted the Define and Punish Clause to
enhance the deliberation achieved by membership in the
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 224 (James Madison).
18. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 159 (1820).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 1, at 44 (John Jay) (attributing the
existence of several such conflicts to improper behavior of border states and their
residents).
20. See generally United States v. Arona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
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community of nations. Publicists like Vattel claimed that
accepting international norms would temper the short-term
impulses toward vanity and revenge that had convulsed Europe.
Membership would discipline those impulses, allowing a longer-
term perspective to emerge. The Framers sought to promote
this turn toward reflection through enactment of the Define and
Punish Clause.
The Clause also contained in miniature the separation of
powers framework that the Framers had constructed to promote
deliberation. Checks and balances would neutralize the
"momentary inclinations" that had cast the Articles of
Confederation period into near anarchy.2 ' Under the Clause,
Congress, not the President, defined the law of nations.
Congressional involvement paved the way for public debate
between the political branches. The necessity for such debate
freed decisions from the monolithic turn of mind that can afflict
the executive branch.22 Hamilton, who had argued in Rutgers v.
Waddington that a New York court had to interpret state law in
light of international law, also saw a role for courts in curbing
the sometimes capricious "humors" of the political branches
and squaring legislation under the Clause with the contours of
the law of nations.23
However, the Framers and subsequent courts recognized
that to define the law of nations, Congress required a zone of
deference. International law, like other "institutions of man,"
did not submit readily to the "efforts of human sagacity."24
Madison, recalling his experience in drafting the Constitution,
also noted with some ruefulness that the codification of any
body of law involved the "unavoidable inaccuracy" of words.25
Defining international law therefore required the exercise of
judgment, not merely the diligence of a scribe. Without a
measure of deference, legislative fear of second-guessing would
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton).
22. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361,
1415-16 (2009) (discussing psychological influences promoting groupthink); cf JACK
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 132
(2012) (praising checks on decision making provided by military lawyers consulting on
targeting decisions).
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton).
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 224 (James Madison).
25. Id. at 225.
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hobble Congress's power under the Define and Punish Clause,26
leaving it to the fate Madison depicted for most previous
democratic experiments: "short in their lives . [and] violent
in their deaths."27
The case for deference was even stronger because the
community of nations that the new Republic sought to join was
hardly a utopia: the Framers knew that European states had
often honored international law mainly in the breach.28 In their
more selfish moments, European powers might view America
not as a member of a community entitled to respect but as
"prey" ripe for the taking.29 Indeed, the Framers included a
number of provisions of the Constitution, such as the Foreign
Gifts Clause and the requirements for election of members of
the House of Representatives, precisely to minimize the dangers
of foreign influence. A decision such as Arjona exhibited this
measure of deference, viewing the counterfeiting of foreign
currencies within the United States as undermining global trade
and therefore a violation of the law of nations, despite the lack
of an express prohibition of counterfeiting in treaties or
customary international law. Counterfeiters, like pirates, were
governed by short-term impulses like greed that threatened to
disrupt global cooperation. The Define and Punish Clause
aimed to control the harm arising from such impulses, in order
to preserve space for long-term perspectives.
The deference the Framers expected is hardly foreign to
international law today, which would also accord a measure of
deference to individual states' assessments of their obligations.
The principle of complementarity in international law requires
that international tribunals accord deference to state
26. See DavidJ. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689,
734 (2008) (observing that "Congress's power to 'define and punish . .. Offences
against the Law of Nations' gives the legislature substantial authority to decide what
conduct violates international law").
27. SeeTHE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 76 (James Madison).
28. See RobertJ. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington
Administration, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 373, 397-98 (2012).
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 1, at 379 (James Madison).
30. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1887).
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investigations of crimes against humanity.3 This approach
builds state capacities for enforcing legal norms. Post-September
11 Security Council resolutions that stress international
cooperation in counterterrorist efforts fortify the argument for
granting states a quantum of discretion."
Based on this domestic and international authority, US
courts should extend a measure of deference to current
attempts by Congress to address the threat posed by terrorist
groups such as Al Qaeda. However, as the plurality opinion by
Justice Stevens hinted when the Supreme Court struck down
President Bush's unilateral establishment of military
commissions, that deference cannot be absolute.3 Some judicial
scrutiny is necessary to preserve the deliberative benefits of the
law of nations that the Framers contemplated in the Define and
Punish Clause.
To realize the membership conception in military
commission trials, courts should defer to Congress's
establishment of either a formal or a functional nexus between
the charges it wishes military commissions to adjudicate and
conduct charged in past military commission proceedings. As
the champions of the categorical approach would acknowledge,
a charge such as aiding and abetting the killing of civilians may
be tried in a commission, because international tribunals have
tried such charges in the past. Going beyond such formal links, a
functional nexus entails an analogy between the underlying
conduct at issue in past proceedings and the conduct alleged in
current trials. Courts can narrowly interpret broad charges of
material support, permitting military commission jurisdiction
only over acts that parallel aiding and abetting liability.
Typically, charges should entail a significant link to violence or
knowing performance of a substantial role in Al Qaeda. In the
cases before the D.C. Circuit, Hamdan's role as bin Laden's
driver would not meet this jurisdictional predicate, although al
Bahlul's conduct as bin Laden's personal propagandist would.
31. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International justice, 49 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 53, 67-68 (2008).
32. SeeS.C. Res. 1373, 1 1(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1873 (Sept. 28, 2001).
33. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558-662 (2006).
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This Article breaks new ground both normatively and
descriptively. It relies on the Enlightenment's psychology of law
as an interpretive lens for both the enactment of the Define and
Punish Clause and subsequent US practice. Other scholars have
noted the Framers' distrust of short-term impulse and their
quest for a structure that would encourage longer-term
perspectives. Previous work, however, has not fully analyzed the
Define and Punish Clause's incorporation of the Framers'
structural innovations such as separation of powers.34 In
addition, other scholars have not situated a zone of deference
for Congress's exercise of power under the Clause within the
Framers' fear of foreign factions.
The approach taken in the Article also presents advantages
over both the US common law of war and categorical
approaches. Unlike the US common law of war approach, the
membership approach is consistent with the Framers'
commitment to the law of nations. Because the Article rejects
the categorical approach's rigid preclusion of material support
charges in military commissions and instead recommends a
functional test for tailoring such charges, it dovetails with the
pragmatic strand found both in the Framers' thought and
international law doctrines such as complementarity.
The Article is in five parts. Part I explores the
Enlightenment psychology of law, arguing that it comprises a
membership view of a global community. Part II explores the
influence of this approach on the Framers. It demonstrates that
the publicists' distrust of short-term impulses played a major
role in the Constitution's treatment of the law of nations. Part
III offers an account of the membership approach that
encompasses American practice from the Founding Era to the
present, including the Civil War, World War II, and the
Nuremberg tribunals. With the exception of Andrew Jackson's
commission for Arbuthnot, American practice has consistently
followed the membership conception. With that backdrop in
place, Part IV discusses the special problems caused by the
MCAs' inclusion of material support charges as offenses triable
34. See Daniel M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 939-40 (2010); see also id. at 1000 (describing the Define and
Punish Clause as a "minor provision").
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by military commission. Part IV also describes the US common
law of war and categorical approaches to this problem, and the
drawbacks of each. It devotes particular attention to the D.C.
Circuit's application of the categorical test in Hamdan II. Part V
applies the membership approach to the problem of material
support. It argues that a tailored approach to conduct
constituting material support fits US precedent and practice and
harmonizes with international law. Part V also addresses
charging conspiracy in military commissions, concluding that
charging conspiracy as a mode of liability, like aiding and
abetting, is appropriate for war crimes such as killing civilians.
However, the law of nations does not support charging
conspiracy as a separate offense that rests on mere agreement to
commit a crime.
I. THE MEMBERSHIP CONCEPTION AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT'S PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW
The Enlightenment thinkers who influenced the Framers
saw membership in a community of nations as an aid for salutary
deliberation that would constrain government. They argued that
domestic and international law corrected for pervasive flaws in
individual psychology. As Pufendorf noted, "not all of the
faculties of man act continually or in a uniform manner; [s]ome
. . . are excited, and then controlled and directed, by an
impulse from within.".5 European thinkers claimed that
monarchs thirsting for glory and revenge had turned the
continent into a landscape of permanent war and gold-
encrusted palaces that yielded grim lives for ordinary people.36
35. 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET Civis JUXTA LEGEM
NATURALEM LIBRI Duo 3 (James B. Scott ed., Frank G. Moore trans., 1927) (1682)
(describing insight that dovetails with recent work in cognitive psychology that suggests
that people make decisions based on inadequate information). See DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 245-48 (2011); see also Daniel Read, Intertemporal Choice, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 424, 428-29 (Derek J.
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (noting that individuals prefer "smaller-sooner
reward"). See Peter Margulies, judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National
Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REv. 195, 205-11 (2010) and Oren
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutional, 112
YALE L.J. 1011 (2003), for a discussion of the role of cognitive biases in national security
policymaking andjudicial review.
36. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 9-12 (1977); cf PIERRE FORCE, SELF-
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To counter these impulses, the philosophers championed the
development of institutions and authorities with three elusive
attributes. Sound institutions and authorities had to bind
officials and private individuals, adapt to changing times, and
maintain continuity with abiding values.37
Without such institutions and authorities, Pufendorf
cautioned that ruinous impulses often overwhelm both state
officials and private individuals.38 Governed by impulse, private
individuals and nations fail to act consistently, undermining
cooperation and making long-term investments of time and
effort impossible.39 By providing standards for members of the
international community, thinkers like Pufendorf and Vattel set
a longer time horizon. 0
For the Enlightenment thinkers, the ascendancy of
international law sprang from the interdependence of nations in
growing global commerce. Rulers who wished to finance wars
and palaces with public debt would be chastened by the negative
reactions of international markets.4' Fear of a prompt market
response would temper the "sudden arbitrary actions of the
sovereign" which Montesquieu and others feared. 42 An
INTEREST BEFORE ADAM SMITH: A GENEALOGY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 165-67 (2003)
(analyzing Adam Smith's view of envy as a disabling impulse); STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 55 (1995)
(discussing Smith's listing of passions that overwhelmed judgment, including "envy,
malice, the longing for revenge, parochial loyalty ... [and] zealotry").
37. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 10-13.
38. See PUFENDORF, supra note 35, at 92; see also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 53-
54 (citing David Hume).
39. PUFENDORF, supra note 35, at 92 (noting that each person, without the benefit
of law, would tend to be an "inconstant friend"); cf HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 53-
54 (discussing Pufendorf's influence on Locke).
40. See PUFENDORF, supra note 35, at 91-92 (observing that law curbs impulses
because it provides the wisdom of a "common judge" as a shared metric for the
resolution of disputes).
41. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 389 1 20
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748) ("[I]n this way commerce was able
to avoid violence and maintain itself everywhere."); HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 73-
74 (citing Montesquieu); FORCE, supra note 36, at 151 (noting that Montesquieu
credited Jewish merchants as inventing bills of exchange that tempered monarchical
power because their intangibility permitted ready trade across borders); cf Francesca
Trivellato, Credit, Honor, and the Early Modern French Legend of the Jewish Invention of Bills
of Exchange, 84 J. MOD. HIST. 289, 323 (2012) (arguing that ascription of the
development of bill of exchange to Jews is largely apocryphal, while noting
Montesquieu's use of story as example of commerce's check on arbitrary governance).
42. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 74.
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appreciation of the "network of mutual obligations" that
international commerce created would defuse the impulses that
prompted armed conflict.43
When war nonetheless broke out, nations' reliance on
global commerce also raised their stake in rules that assuaged
the inevitable resentments engendered by conflict. As Vattel
argued, the uncertainty and chaos endemic to war make it
"difficult always to form a precise judgment of what the present
case requires."44 Giving way to short-term impulses in the
conduct of war could unleash unnecessary force that would spur
further violence and complicate the restoration of peace and
commerce.45 To curb the impulse to wield gratuitous force,
Vattel urged, it was "absolutely necessary that nations should
reciprocally conform to general rules."46
In refining these rules, Vattel described a trend in state
practice toward heeding "the voice of humanity" regarding the
treatment of captives.47 The impulse toward expediency, Vattel
admitted, could mute this voice, particularly when fighting an
enemy that was "savage, perfidious, and formidable."4 As David
Hume also acknowledged, the desire for revenge could obscure
humanity's urgings.49 However, international law increasingly
recognized that "[o]n an enemy's submitting and laying down
of arms, we cannot with justice take away his life."" The state
could benefit from being seen as deliberate and just.
Membership in the community of nations required emulation of
the "generous" leader whose actions were guided by a longer-
term perspective.51
43. See id. at 75; see also id. at 80 (citing Montesquieu, who observed that "the
natural effect of commerce is .. . peace ... [t]wo nations that trade together become
mutually dependent").
44. See VATTEL, supra note 11, 1 137.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. 1 151; cf Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 795 (2010)
(discussing history of balancing two values).
48. VATTEL, supra note 11, 1 151.
49. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 54 (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON
HUMAN NATURE (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1878)).
50. VATTEL, supra note 11, 140.
51. See id. 1151.
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For Vattel, a state's membership also implied responsibility
for harm that impulsive citizens could inflict on the
international order. Because individuals driven by short-term
impulses could ignite unnecessary conflicts, Vattel declared that
the power to make war "solely belongs to the sovereign power,"
who is best situated to judge "circumstances of the utmost
importance to the . . . state."52 Allowing individuals acting on
their own to engage in armed conflict against foreign states
would be "dangerous," since any individual under the sway of
ideology or avarice could "involve [the state] in war."53 War
could occur because a state victimized by the incursions of
individuals from another state has rights by virtue of its own
membership in the international community.54 The victim state
need not be a hostage to the short-term impulses of another
state's nationals; instead, it may "enter [the defaulting] country
in pursuit" of its enemies.55 A victim state that captures
52. Id. 223; cf Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged
Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY &
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, HARVARD UNIV. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, Winter 2005,
available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/
OccasionalPaper2.pdf (discussing traditional elements of law of war, including
requirement that individuals engaged in hostilities had to have "right authority" which
is defined as state sanction).
53. VATTEL, supra note 11, 14.
54. See id.
55. Id. 1 133. Following Vattel, US policymakers have located this prerogative in a
victim state's right of self-defense. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law. The
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (stating US policy when
another state is unable or unwilling to control nonstate actors who threaten the US or
US personnel). The law of neutrality has also recently furnished a useful analogy for a
state's prerogatives in non-international armed conflicts with groups such as Al Qaeda.
See Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA.J. INT'L L. 483, 499-503 (2012); see also Karl S. Chang,
Enemy Status and Militaty Detention in the War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT'L LJ. 1, 25-
36 (2011) (looking to neutrality law to define "enemy" who can be targeted or
detained); cf. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention
and Targeting Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049532 (suggesting additional guidelines for use
of force). But see Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict
with Al Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 75 (2011) (arguing that neutrality law has little to say
about detention of suspected terrorists based in another state).
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individuals who have violated the laws of war may impose
appropriate punishment.56
Policing the short-term impulses that drive violations of the
law of war required not merely legal norms, but also institutions
to enforce them. Institutional architecture had to ensure against
the resurgence of the absolute monarchs who had wasted
Europe's blood and treasure. To avoid replicating the risks of
individuals' short-term thinking, institutions needed a careful
blend of independence and overlap. In the 17th century,
Pufendorf sought to promote this longer-term perspective with a
larger role for courts. To further this project, he developed a
series of maxims, such as interpreting norms to maximize
"common advantage" or "peace" between persons and states
and tailoring them to avoid absurd results.57 Montesquieu
expanded on this insight, developing a theory of checks and
balances in which the agenda of each branch curbed the
others.58 One can read Vattel as less committed to institutions;
indeed, American officials who resisted the membership
conception's reliance on institutions like judicial review cited
Vattel's assertion that a state may summarily execute "banditti"
who kill and plunder indiscriminately.59 However, this is an
unduly superficial reading. Vattel conditioned application of the
death penalty on a finding that the captive was "guilty" of
exceptionally serious violations of the laws of war.co Such a
determination requires a fair and accurate process.61 Hasty or
56. See VATTEL, supra note 11, 141 (stating punishment is appropriate for a
"breach of the law of nations, and particularly when [the offending individual] has
violated the laws of war").
57. See PUFENDORF, supra note 35, at 85.
58. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36, at 7778 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, COMPLETE
WORKS 112 (1949)) ("So that there may be no abuse of power, it is necessary that,
through [institutional design] . .. power be stopped by power.").
59. VATTEL, supra note 11, 1 226 (asserting that if individuals act on their own
after nation declares war, the "enemy shows them no mercy, but hangs them up as he
would so many robbers or banditti"); see also Letter fromJ.Q. Adams, Sec'y of State, to
George W. Erving, Minister Plenipotentiary to Spain (Nov. 18, 1818), reprinted in 4
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 539-41(1834) [hereinafter Adams
Letter] (citing Vattel in endorsingJackson's use of military commissions in 1818 during
the Second Seminole War).
60. VATTEL, supra note 11, 141.
61. See generally id. 11 136-59 (discussing standards and recommendations for
putting prisoners to death).
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biased decisions would merely replicate the short-term impulses
that the philosophers sought to curb.
In curbing harm triggered by the short-term impulses of
officials, citizens, and foreign nationals, the publicists believed
that states under the membership conception needed some
discretion. As Pufendorf recognized, a legal system that sought
to preclude all flexibility would soon become mechanical in
application, since the future's "infinite variety" demands
exceptions to general rules.62 A member of a community should
not be set up to fail. By virtue of its membership, a state had
some leeway to "judge what her own particular situation
authorizes." 68 This leeway was not unlimited; certain principles,
such as diplomatic immunity, were absolute.64 Nevertheless, for
international law to form a workable system, states needed a
zone of deference.65 Exercising judgment within this zone, states
could refine approaches that were broadly consistent with
established norms and also fostered global compliance.
II. THE FRAMERS ON MEMBERSHIP
The Framers refined and deepened the psychological
perspective pioneered by the European philosophers. Like the
publicists, they believed that short-term impulses such as
vengeance threatened to commandeer official and individual
decisions.66 The deleterious influence of short-term impulses in
the individual states was central to the case for a strong federal
government.67 In holding recently that much of Arizona's
immigration law was preempted by federal legislation, the
62. PUFENDORF, supra note 35, at 85.
63. VATTEL, supra note 11,1 137.
64. Id. 138.
65. See id. It 136-59.
66. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2009) (noting the Framers' debt to Vattel); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 1, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
confederacy under a weak federal government would prompt disputes among members
and soon lead to armed conflict, in which the "passions . .. observe no bounds of
moderation," and aggrieved parties would go to "any extremes necessary to avenge the
affront").
67. See Letter of Edmund Randolph (Oct. 10, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 482,
483 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (noting that "law of nations is unprovided with
sanctions in many cases," resulting in "wretched impotency" in deterring violations).
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Supreme Court cited Jay's observation that individual states
acting "under the impulse of sudden irritation" could defy
international law and disrupt foreign relations.68 Haunted by
worries that a failure to comply would doom the new Republic
to foreign domination, the Framers devised institutions such as
the separation of powers that would promote compliance and
allow for progress in the humanity of international norms. The
Define and Punish Clause contributed to that goal, cementing
America's place in the global system and deterring individuals at
home and abroad whose short-sighted actions could undermine
America's global standing. However, the Framers were not
naive. They also recognized that harmful foreign influence
could distort both domestic and foreign policy.69 The Define
and Punish Clause encouraged Congress to refine the disparate
strands of the law of nations into a guide with greater "certainty
and uniformity."70 Secure in the knowledge that the separation
of powers would guide the Clause's implementation, the
Framers' views implied that a measure of deference to
Congress's handiwork was appropriate.
A. Impulses, Institutions, and the Constitution's Treatment of the Law
ofNations
Hamilton, a lawyer by trade well-acquainted with the
European philosophers, was most acute in elaborating on the
psychological argument that the philosophers had pioneered. In
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton famously warned of short-term
impulses' pernicious effects, decrying the "ill humors" that
overtook the political branches.71 Hamilton's concern was the
product of years practicing international law in New York, where
he saw first-hand the ill effects of impulses that discounted the
law of nations during the Articles of Confederation period.72
68. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498-99 (2012) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 1, at 39 Uohn jay)).
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 1, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton)
(warning that foreign powers would seek to take advantage of confederation's weakness
and dissension).
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 1, at 262 (James Madison) (noting that
such uniformity was "necessary and proper").
71. See THE FEDERALISTNo. 78, supra note 1, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).
72. See LAW PRACrICE, supra note 12, at 419.
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Hamilton's experience is revealed most vividly in the case of
Rutgers v. Waddington.7
In Rutgers, Hamilton argued that the law of nations should
govern interpretation of New York's Trespass Act, which allowed
citizens to seek damages against British nationals who had seized
their property during the war.74 Hamilton asserted that the law
of nations shielded the defendant, who had seized the property
in compliance with military orders.75 He argued that the case
was nothing less than a contest over "national character."76
Nations in an earlier era may have given in to the impulse for
revenge. However, Hamilton urged, this impulse clashed with
the need for a stable peace treaty with Britain. According to
Hamilton, widespread concern over the decades of war that had
engulfed Europe and the New World had "refined"
international norms and lent priority to a "principle of . .
. amnesty."77 Others argued, in short-sighted fashion, that New
York was under no obligation to obey the law of nations.78
Hamilton derided this parochial turn, contending that New
York could no more shed the law of nations than it could detach
itself from the "relations of Universal society."79 Agreeing with
Hamilton's psychological account, the court read the law of
nations into the New York law, rejecting the impulse toward
"revenge" and the "hatred and animosity" revenge generates. 80
Instead, the court embraced "benevolence even towards our
enemies."8' Viewing this more benign stance as an underlying
principle of the law of nations, the court sought to avoid the
"confusion" that would result "if each separate state should
arrogate to itself a right of changing at pleasure [the] laws . .
73. See id. at 393. For a discussion of Rutgers, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note
34, at 963-66 (discussing Rutgers as guide to Hamilton's view that law of nations was
part of American law and would exert salutary influence on US sensibilities), and John
Fabian Witt, The Dismal Histoiy of the Laws of War, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 895, 899-905
(2011) (discussing Rutgers's importance).
74. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 964-65.
75. Id. at 963-64.
76. See IAw PRACrIcE, supra note 12, at 362.
77. Id. at 361.
78. Id. at 367.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 400 n.*.
81. Id.
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. of the civilized world." 2 Even if revenge had been an
acceptable impulse at some earlier time, New York now faced "a
new situation," as part of "one of the nations of the earth"
bound to comply with the law that bound those nations
together.83
Because the Rutgers court's acknowledgment of the United
States' "new situation" was a rarity during the Articles of
Confederation period, the Framers feared that the temptations
of impulse could sever the ties that sustained membership in the
community of nations. The Framers' choices gave government
the capacity to limit damage caused by individuals' short-
sightedness. Violations of diplomatic immunity had roiled the
Articles of Confederation period, as an assault in Philadelphia
on the French Consul General Marbois and another such attack
in New York ignited confrontations with European powers.84
Edmund Randolph, in his remarks opening the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia, had cited these incidents and the
states' perceived failure to control them as a central justification
for a stronger federal government.8 -5 Writing in Federalist No. 3,
John Jay noted the challenge to peace posed by a "disunited
America" in which disparate actors offended foreign powers.86
Stressing the psychological dimension, Jay warned that both
individuals and American states were susceptible to "passions"
82. Id. at 405-06.
83. Id. at 400.
84. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716-17 (2004) (noting that concern
over "inadequate vindication of the law of nations persisted through the time of the
Constitutional Convention"); see also Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and
Defining in the Constitution's Law of Nations Clause, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1675, 1692-93
(2012) [hereinafter Kontorovich, Discretion and Delegation] (discussing impact of
episode on deliberations of the Framers). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute
and Article 111, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 640-41 (2002) (questioning the incident's
importance); J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish
Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEx. L. REv. 843, 874-88 (2007) [hereinafter
Kent, Define and Punish].
85. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 24-25 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (warning that, under the Articles of Confederation, "[i]f a
State acts against a foreign power contrary to the laws of nations or violates a treaty,
[the federal government] cannot punish that State, or compel its obedience to the
treaty. It can only leave the offending State to the operations of the offended power. It
therefore cannot prevent a war."); cf Kent, Define and Punish, supra note 84, at 897-99
(discussing Randolph's views).
86. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 1, at 36-37 (John Jay).
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that precipitated clashes with Native American and foreign
nations.87
The Define and Punish Clause was part of the Framers'
program for addressing these perils. Madison in Federalist No.
42 explained that the Define and Punish Clause would deter
violations of the law of nations such as assaults on ambassadors
and defiance of treaties, which had allowed "any indiscreet
member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations."88 By
authorizing Congress to enact laws governing piracy and
felonies on the high seas, the Clause further extended the
legislature's ability to deter non-state actors whose conduct
could endanger international cooperation.
Like the universe in a grain of sand, the Framers'
overarching ideas about separation of powers figured in the
Define and Punish Clause's text and design. Granting the
President sole power to define violations of the law of nations
would have expanded the Executive's institutional advantage
over the other branches. Granting this power to Congress
dispersed power and substituted dialog for executive fiat. In this
sense, the Clause's text followed the recommendation of
Madison, echoing Montesquieu, that "[a]mbition must be made
to counteract ambition."89 In a post-September 11 case, Justice
Stevens reinforced this view of the Clause, suggesting that a
unilateral executive attempt to define violations of the law of
nations punishable by military commissions expanded the reign
of short-term impulses that the Framers had hoped to defuse. 0
One can also read colloquy at the Constitutional Convention as
suggesting that allowing the President alone to determine what
87. Id. at 38-39.
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 1, at 262 (James Madison).
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 319 (James Madison). Madison
actually presumed that the Congress would be the dominant branch of government See
id. (claiming that "[iin republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates"). However, the overall trajectory of Article I's grants of legislative
authority still bears out Madison's intent.
90. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 601 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(finding that the Constitution did not authorize President's unilateral classification of
conspiracy as a war crime, citing Madison's observation in Federalist No. 47 that
" [a] ccumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands .. . may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny").
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conduct violated international law would yield prohibitions "too
vague" to provide adequate notice.91
Another key element of the Clause's design hinges on the
role of courts, which would promote fidelity to international law
principles if Congress defaulted. Hamilton's discussion of
judicial review in Federalist No. 78 echoed his arguments in
Rutgers v. Waddington, noting that a court interpreting two legal
doctrines or provisions that appear to clash should seek "any fair
construction [which allows them to be] . . . reconciled to each
other."92 A court applying this rule of construction would seek to
harmonize a federal statute with international law, as Chief
Justice Marshall did some years later in Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy.93 James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a prosecutor in
the Marbois case, 94 delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
and later Justice of the Supreme Court, also envisioned a robust
role for the courts, prophesying that " [t] o every citizen of the
United States, this law [of nations] is not only a rule of conduct,
but may be a rule of decision."95
Wilson, Randolph, and other supporters of the Constitution
anticipated that the courts would constrain the scope of
91. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (remarks of Gouverneur Morris of New York). However, this
interpretation is subject to debate, because "elite opinion" at the time of the
Convention held that violations of the law of nations were common law crimes whose
prosecution did not require legislative codification. See Kent, Define and Punish, supra
note 84, at 899. Morris's exchange with James Wilson of Pennsylvania may instead have
been intended to provide Congress with a measure of discretion in codifying portions
of international law. See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton).
93. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)
(holding that the navy commander lacked statutory authority for seizure of vessel
owned by a national of a neutral power, and the vessel was therefore protected under
international law). See Curtis A. Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) [hereinafter
Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon] (offering qualified praise of Charming Betsy canon); see
also Peter Margulies, judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institutional Equity,
and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004) (arguing that courts should
interpret statutes authorizing force as being consistent with international humanitarian
law); see generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International
Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005) (offering a broader view
of the canon's application).
94. See Kent, Define and Punish, supra note 84, at 878 n.169.
95. James Wilson, Of Man, as a Member of the Great Commonwealth of Nations,
in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 673, 688 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall
eds., 2007).
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Congress's power and ensure that any prosecutions comported
with procedural safeguards. While Antifederalists who opposed
the Constitution warned that the federal government could
invoke the Define and Punish Clause to suppress speech that
was critical of American foreign policy, supporters of the
Constitution pointedly rejected such a sweeping reading.96
Wilson asserted that the Define and Punish Clause barred
Congress from punishing noncitizens in a manner conflicting
with the "predominant authority of the law of nations."9
Foreshadowing the result in United States v. Furong,98 the only
decision to strike down a statute passed pursuant to the Clause,
Wilson asserted that Congress lacked the power to classify a
murder at sea committed in the course of piracy as an act of
piracy.9 While this position may seem peculiar to a modern
audience, it illustrates the Framers' belief that the statutes
enacted under the Clause should receive meaningful review.100
For an even more vivid example of the Framers' view that
the trial of alleged violations of the law of nations requires
safeguards, consider a debate at the Virginia ratifying
convention between Patrick Henry and Edmund Randolph. On
the surface, the debate concerned the need for the
Constitution's Bill of Attainder Clause. However, it also sheds
light on contemporary understandings of the law of nations. In
the debate, Randolph criticized on fairness grounds the
supposed summary execution of Josiah Phillips, a murderous
Loyalist who had terrorized the Virginia countryside during the
96. See Kent, Define and Punish, supra note 84, at 909-10 (discussing the writings of
Federalist and Anti-federalist pamphleteers).
97. James Wilson, A Charge Delivered to the Grand Jury in the Circuit Court of
the United States, for the District of Virginia (May 1791), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON, supra note 95, at 334 [hereinafter Grand Jury Charge]. SeeJules Lobel,
Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J.
INT'L L. 307, 344-45 (2011) (discussing Wilson's view).
98. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 202 (1820).
99. Grand Jury Charge, supra note 97, at 332 (contending that piracy only
encompassed "robbery and depredation" on the high seas, and that a murder committed
in the course of piracy was punishable as a murder under international maritime law,
with those who played a supporting role guilty only as accessories) (emphasis in
original).
100. Cf Tara Helfman, Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the
Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 65 n.75 (2012)
(referring to Furlong holding and rationale as "strange").
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Revolutionary War.o'0 Randolph asserted that a bill of attainder,
forbidden under the proposed Constitution, had been issued
with no concrete information, but upon "mere reliance on
general reports." 02 Despite being deprived of the opportunity to
confront his accusers or provide evidence on his own behalf,
Randolph recalled, Phillips was convicted and executed.',o
Randolph suggested that the proposed Constitution's
prohibition of bills of attainder would have ensured a fair trial
for Phillips.104 While Phillips was a citizen, his alleged crimes
occurred during participation in the Revolutionary War.
Randolp's position therefore also has relevance for the Framers'
views on the international law of armed conflict. Randolph's
insistence on procedural safeguards cast him as a worthy
successor to Vattel's praise of the "voice of humanity."
Henry, an opponent of the Constitution who had sought a
bill of attainder for Phillips as governor of Virginia, disputed
Randolph's contention in terms borrowed expressly from Vattel
and the law of nations. Rejecting the need for the procedural
protections that the proposed Constitution would yield in such a
case, Henry cited Vattel for the proposition that Phillips was "a
pirate, an outlaw . .. a common enemy to all mankind, [who]
may be put to death at any time." 05 Henry, like others who
would contest the membership view in the future, cited Vattel's
language but ignored the European scholar's concern with the
fairness and accuracy of adjudication.
In a stroke of irony, both Henry and Randolph had faulty
recollections of this episode: after the Virginia legislature had
passed the bill of attainder for Phillips, Randolph himself had
drafted an ordinary civil indictment of Phillips for highway
robbery, and had supervised a trial for Phillips upon his
capture. 06 Phillips was convicted and executed, but only after he
101. See William Romaine Tyree, The Case ofJosiah Phillips: How Virginia Came to
Pass a Bill of Attainder, 16 VA. L. REG. 648, 648-49 (1911) (explaining Phillips's crimes
and the connection of Randolph and Henry to his case).
102. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 66 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2d ed. 1836).
103. See id. at 67.
104. See id. (arguing for the adoption of the Constitution).
105. Id. at 140.
106. See Tyree, supra note 101, at 654-55 (explaining Randolph's connection to
the case).
23
24 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
received the protections of the legal process whose supposed
absence Randolph, perhaps spoiling for a fight with Henry,
bemoaned a decade later. 0 7 Randolph's actions, even more than
his words, dovetailed with the membership conception's
rejection of short-sighted impulses.
B. Foreign Factions, Codification's Challenges, and Deference to
Congress's Judgments on the Law of Nations
In part due to the safeguards on the power to define and
punish, the Framers suggested that they intended to carve out a
reasonable zone of deference for Congress's exercise of its
authority. Factors justifying this zone of deference included the
range and fluidity of international law, the distinctive needs of
each state and dangers of foreign factions, and the separation of
powers' promotion of fidelity to core international principles.
Because the Framers understood that customary
international law is vast and always changing, 08 they recognized
that even the "most enlightened legislators" would fail in
precisely demarcating its boundaries.109 The elusive character of
customary international law, with its reliance on a myriad of
sources establishing a consensus of state opinion and practice,
compounded this challenge. As Justice Story suggested in United
States v. Smith, the Framers lodged in Congress the power to
define offenses against the law of nations in large part because
they recognized the law of nations could not be "completely
ascertained and defined" in any preexisting code, or one that
would be drafted in the foreseeable future."10
A state's distinctive needs also counseled a measure of
deference insulated from foreign influence. Just as short-sighted
impulses were the enemy of the deliberation that membership
required, so was foreign manipulation. The Framers believed
107. See id. at 654-56 (suggesting that Randolph may have been anxious to debate
Henry about the execution of Phillips).
108. See LAW PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 361 (predicting gradual extension of
"principle of.. . amnesty" resolving property disputes after peace treaty in favor of bona
fide purchasers) (emphasis in original).
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 229 (James Madison) (describing
difficulty of "delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of
laws ... [including] common law ... [and] maritime law").
110. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 159 (1820).
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that influence exerted by the contending European powers had
much in common with the short-term impulses that the
Constitution's architecture was designed to withstand: foreign
influence pushed particular agendas to the forefront without
the circumspection that the Framers admired. Hamilton argued
against a confederation in part on the grounds that dissension
among the members would encourage weaker states to seek
"recourse [from] . .. foreign powers.""' Randolph warned that
extravagant gifts from the King of France to Benjamin Franklin
and others had "disturbed confidence" in the relationship
between France and the United States." 2 The bar on such
gratuities in the Foreign Gifts Clause connoted the Framers'
efforts to shield the deliberations of American officials from
these blandishments." Hamilton relied on similar reasoning in
defending the Treaty Clause's requirement that a super-majority
of the Senate vote to ratify an agreement. Expressing the fear
that a cabal of senators might otherwise have "prostituted their
influence ... as the mercenary instruments of foreign
corruption" and championed a treaty that injured American
interests, Hamilton was reassured that two-thirds of that august
body would not bow to such a devious strategy.1 4 The residency
requirements for election to the House of Representatives and
the shifting composition of the Electoral College were also parts
of the Framers' blueprint for excluding foreig influence. 15
Ill. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 1, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton).
112. DAVID ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
OF VIRGINIA 330-31 (2d ed., 1805); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing origins of the foreign gifts provision); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 393 n.245 (2009) (same); cf Peter Margulies,
Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
455, 471-75 (2012) [hereinafter Margulies, Advising Terrorism] (discussing the origins
of the constitutional provisions in light of current concerns about foreign terrorist
organizations); Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout's
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 5 (2012) (acknowledging that
the Framers were concerned about foreign influence, but arguing that this concern was
only one of a number of factors that the Framers had to balance). Ironically,
Randolph's indiscreet disclosures to a French diplomat eventually forced his
resignation from Washington's cabinet. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE
AGE OF FEDERALISM 425-29 (1993).
113. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
114. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, supra note 1, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton).
115. Concerning the residency requirements of the House of Representatives,
George Mason of Virginia warned that a "rich foreign Nation, for example Great
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Furthermore, there are hints that the Framers understood
that the formation of customary international law could also be
plagued by the ills of faction that they sought to manage
throughout the constitutional scheme. The Framers, as students
of the world stage, were well aware that European powers during
this period frequently acted expediently, instead of standing on
principle." 6 Madison did not view faction's evils at stopping at
the water's edge; rather, he saw such evils
"everywhere ... divid [ing] mankind into parties."" 7 For Madison,
the proliferation of factions "inflamed ... with mutual
animosity" and... "ambitiously contending for pre-eminence
and power" was a "propensity of mankind," as was the "zeal for
different opinions ... concerning government."" 8 The role of
factions on the global stage suggested the need for prudence in
determining when an innovation has ripened into a rule of
customary international law." 9 Before settling on a consensus,
short-term impulses within the international community might
ebb and flow with the ascendancy of various factions.120 Some of
those factions might intentionally or inadvertently propound
rules with adverse consequences for the United States.' 2'
The Framers' intent to neutralize this risk also figured in
the drafting and construction of the Define and Punish Clause.
Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for
insidious purposes." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 91, at
216. After Mason's warning, the Framers required that, at the time of election, a
member of the House of Representatives be a United States citizen for seven years and
an "inhabitant" of the state that included the member's district. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2, cl. 2. Regarding the Electoral College, Hamilton argued that the Electoral College's
temporary operation and fluid membership would frustrate "the desire in foreign
powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils." THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra
note 1, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton). Permitting longer membership in a sitting body,
Hamilton claimed, would facilitate foreign efforts at corruption. Id.
116. See Reinstein, supra note 28, at 397-98.
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 73-74 (James Madison) (emphasis
added).
118. Id.
119. See generally Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International
Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1804 (2009) (noting that
"problem of uncertainty is most severe with respect to customary international law,
which lacks any clear rule of recognition").
120. See David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A
Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 363, 372-73 (applying
Madison's theory of factionalism to an international stage).
121. See id.
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In a debate at the Constitutional Convention, Governor Morris
of New York successfully argued that the language of the clause
should expressly empower Congress to "define," as well as
punish, offenses against the law of nations. 22 While
Pennsylvania's James Wilson argued that it would have the "look
of arrogance" for Congress to purport to "define the law of
nations which depended on the authority of all the Civilized
Nations of the World," Morris took a more practical view.'23
Morris argued that granting Congress power to define offenses
would both provide greater notice to defendants who might
otherwise be unaware of the domestic obligations that the law of
nations engendered and allow Congress some room to tailor
international norms to United States interests. 24 Often, Morris
worried, the writings of philosophers, multifarious state
pronouncements, and accounts of state practice that made up
the law of nations would prove "too vague and deficient to be a
rule."'25 Morris's concern suggested that Congress would play a
valuable role by not merely defining the law of nations in a
mechanical fashion, but refining that occasionally turgid and
murky stream of disparate sources.126 When the operation of a
rule lacked predictability and manageability, Congress could
supply those qualities. 27 Moreover, if parties with parochial
agendas, including foreign states or other entities, precipitously
claimed that the law of nations had changed, relying on
Congress to set a rule would prevent an unduly hasty shift in
abiding principles. 28
122. See 2 THE REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 91, at
615; cf Kent, Define and Punish, supra note 84, at 899 (discussing the exchange between
Morris and James Wilson); Kontorovich, Discretion and Delegation, supra note 84, at
1700-02.
123. 2 THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 91, at 615
(emphasis in original).
124. See Note, The Offenses Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARv. L. REV.
2378, 2386 (2005).
125. 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 91, at 615.
126. See id. at 614-15.
127. See id.; cf Kent, Define and Punish, supra note 84, at 899 ("Morris's desire for
prior notice and clear definition sounds in the due process and legality principle
concerns .. . about vague criminal statutes.").
128. Cf id (arguing that Morris might have believed that "Congress should not be
bound by anyone else's view but its own as to whether an offense [against the law of
nations] had been committed by another state.. . .").
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Madison, while not opining directly on this language,
suggested similar views in his discussion of the portion of the
Define and Punish Clause relating to felonies on the high seas.
In Federalist No. 42, Madison noted that wide variations in the
definition of felonies would otherwise impair the
implementation of the authority that the Framers conveyed:
"[f]or the sake of certainty and uniformity," Madison urged,
"the power of defining.. was in every respect necessary and
proper." 29 Any other result might have left the republic hostage
to casual shifts with unintended consequences that injured
American interests. Membership required greater stability.
Finally, one predicate for deference was the reliability
conferred on United States formulations of international law by
the separation of powers. Like any other power in the
Constitution, the Framers saw the authority granted by the
Define and Punish Clause through the prism of checks and
balances.13 0 A measure passing through this prism would shed
the influence of short-term impulse.'1' In Jay's words regarding
the federal government's superiority over individual states in
managing foreign affairs, it would be "temperate and cool." 32
III. THE DEFINE AND PUNISH CLAUSE FROM THE FOUNDING
ERA TO THE PRESENT
A. The Founding Era: Contention and Consensus
After the Constitution's enactment, the Founding Era saw
challenges to the balancing act that membership in the
community of nations necessarily entails. Washington's
Neutrality Proclamation and continued concern about foreign
intrigue highlighted the importance of the state as a filter for
short-term impulses.'33 Institutions such as judicial review
followed the direction set in Rutgers v. Waddington, promoting
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 1, at 266 (James Madison).
130. See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text (discussing views of Hamilton,
Wilson, and Randolph on the role of the courts).
131. SeeTHE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 1, at 39 (JohnJay).
132. See id.
133. See generally ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 112, at 336-41 (discussing the
arguments Hamilton and Jefferson offered Washington before the issuance of the
Neutrality Proclamation).
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greater deliberation among the political branches on measures
that might conflict with the law of nations.
Serving as the nation's first Attorney General, Edmund
Randolph reaffirmed the Framers' insight that "a nation could
not maintain an honorable place amongst the nations of the
world that does not regard the great and essential principles of
the law of nations as a part of the law of the land." 34 After an
arrest at a diplomat's residence by a New York constable, the
tender feelings left by the Marbois incident impelled Randolph
to restate the importance of the core doctrine of diplomatic
immunity.'-5 Randolph opined that the Define and Punish
Clause did not authorize any material changes in this
fundamental rule.136
The relatively light lifting of the diplomatic immunity
question was followed by a more demanding challenge in the
Neutrality Crisis. 37 The crisis arose from persistent intrigue by
France that sought to involve both United States citizens and the
new Republic's government in France's conflict with Britain. 38
Washington recognized that neutrality in the European conflict
was a safer course for a new nation unequipped for war. 9 The
French diplomat Edmond Genet ignored Washington and
approached citizens directly, outfitting at least one privateer that
sailed from American shores to prey on British shipping. 40 In
response, Randolph issued an opinion that justified the seizure
of a British vessel that had been taken as prize by a French
privateer and led into the port of Philadelphia by an American
citizen, Gideon Henfield.' 41 Randolph, who had relied on
134. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865).
135. See Who Privileged from Arrest, supra note 13, at 27-28.
136. Id. at *2 (advising that Clause only permitted "modifications on some points
of indifference").
137. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 112, at 336 (discussing events
surrounding Neutrality Proclamation).
138. See generally id. at 341-54 (discussing Genet's failed attempt to garner support
for France in the United States during France's war with Britain).
139. Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over
Presidential Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 44
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) [hereinafter Flaherty,
Neutrality Controversy].
140. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 112, at 332-53; Flaherty, Neutrality
Controversy, supra note 139, at 44; MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 78-80 (2007).
141. See Seizure in Neutral Waters, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1793).
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Vattel's views in crafting the administration's position, stated
that "to attack an enemy in a neutral territory is absolutely
unlawful." 42 Jefferson was even more pointed in his
condemnation of Genet's machinations. Echoing Vattel's view
that individuals relying on short-term impulses posed a danger
for a nation committed to deliberation on foreign policy,
Jefferson declared that for "United States citizens to commit
murders and depredations on the members of nations at peace
with us. .. [was] as much against the law of the land as to
murder or rob [other US citizens]." 4 3 Washington, in a
Proclamation announcing the neutrality policy largely drafted
by Randolph (who again relied heavily on Vattel), barred
American citizens from aiding either side to the European
conflict.'4
Founding Era anxiety about foreign influence co-existed
with mistrust of overzealous government and reliance on the
separation of powers as a remedy.'14 Popular constitutional
sentiment opposed the prosecution of Henfield, who may have
violated neutrality law but had not violated any US statutes.146Jay
and Wilson, riding circuit as part of their Supreme Court duties,
instructed the jury on the dangers of individuals substituting
their impulse for "revenge" for the government's judgment on
142. Id. at 33. See Reinstein, supra note 28, at 398-99 (discussing Randolph's
reliance on Vattel).
143. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (June 17, 1793), in 9
WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 131,136 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
144. See Reinstein, supra note 28, at 429-33 (noting Randolph's reliance on
Vattel).
145. Another instance of French intrigue undermined Randolph. Randolph was
forced to resign after revelations that he had informed a French diplomat of cabinet
squabbling over the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania and the controversial
treaty on British property in America thatJay had negotiated. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK,
supra note 112, at 425-29. John Marshall was the next target of French officials'
passions for clandestine influence. Marshall was part of the US delegation to France
undone by the notorious XYZ Affair, in which French officials tried to extort money
from Marshall and his colleagues. See II ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 306-12 (1916); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 112, at 568; cf H.
Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1471, 1511-27 (1999) (analyzing Marshall's perspective on presidential
power and foreign policy).
146. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (2004).
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foreign policy.147 Nonetheless, the people appeared to side with
James Monroe's position that a prosecution should not rest on
mere defiance of an executive proclamation.148 This reaction
surely contributed to Henfield's acquittal. 49 Washington,
displaying the disposition toward dialogue that marked his
presidency, put his neutrality policy on a firmer footing by
securing congressional authorization.o50
Courts also protected against the short-term impulses of the
political branches by ensuring that Congress deliberated about
clashes between statutes and international law. Writing for the
Court in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, Marshall echoed
the New York court's decision in Rutgers v. Waddington,
construing a federal statute to avoid conflict with the law of
nations.'5 ' In accordance with this maxim, Marshall read a
statute that limited citizens' trade with France as not barring
commerce by subjects of neutral states such as Denmark.''5 2 By
upholding the principle that "an act of Congress ought never to
147. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360)
(John Jay); cf id. at 1119-21 (James Wilson) (arguing that common law prosecution
was permissible and describing individuals who violated neutrality policy as short-
sighted; by risking war, such individuals would be "destroying not only those with
whom we have no hostility, but destroying each other").
148. See Reinstein, supra note 28, at 434; cf Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 664-87 (2004)
(arguing that while Washington's actions during the Neutrality Crisis may well have
been within his constitutional authority, they do not bear out claims that the Vesting
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, grants the President broad residual authority over
foreign affairs); Flaherty, Neutrality Controversey, supra note 139, at 26-39 (discussing the
law of nations and presidential power aspects of the Neutrality Proclamation).
149. See KRAMER, supra note 146, at 3; Reinstein, supra note 28, at 439; cf Larry
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594,
1599-1615 (2005) (assessing arguments against constitutional interpretation by people
and elected officials); Jared Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular
Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 827, 856-66 (2011) (cautioning that popular
constitutionalism is a double-edged sword which can protect liberty, but is also
susceptible to manipulation).
150. See Reinstein, supra note 28, at 440. While controversy attended efforts to
prosecute violations of the Neutrality Proclamation as common law crimes, no one
doubted that Congress had the power to prohibit such conduct. See also Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 850-51 (1997).
151. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 81
(1804). Compare Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 93 (praising the narrow
view of the canon as promoting deliberation), with Wuerth, supra note 93 (favoring a
broader view of the canon).
152. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 80-85.
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be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains,"'53 Marshall provided an institutional
hedge against the "momentary inclinations" that Hamilton
feared' 54 and modeled the more considered view that
membership in the community of nations requires deliberation
to preemptively resolve such conflicts.
B. Military Commissions and the Define and Punish Clause Since the
Founding Era
The membership conception has dominated the
jurisprudence of the Define and Punish Clause since the
Founding Era, including practice during the Civil War and
during and immediately after World War II. Control of state
actors and individuals arrayed against United States interests has
been a common theme, including situations such as piracy and
counterfeiting in which US interests largely harmonized with
international interests. The separation of powers has often
figured in precedent and practice, with checks and balances
prominent in the jurisdiction and operation of military
commissions. Our account of post-Founding Era developments
must begin, however, with General Andrew Jackson's use of
military commissions during the First Seminole War - an
episode where separation of powers was lacking when it was
needed most.
1. Jackson's Florida Campaign and Military Commissions
The military commission convictions of British nationals
Robert Ambrister and Alexander Arbuthnot occurred in the
wake of Jackson's 1818 intervention in Florida-then a Spanish
colony. Jackson had moved to stop cross-border raids by
Seminoles and other Native Americans who claimed land in
Georgia under the Treaty of Ghent.'55 Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams supported the convictions and executions of
Ambrister and Arbuthnot, asserting that each had violated
Spanish neutrality through their alleged instigation of the
153. Id. at 118.
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton).
155. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 14, at 531, 532; see also 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 641 (1801).
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raids.'56 Jackson touted the proceedings as an "example to the
world" of the fate that awaited "unprincipled villains."'57 Despite
Jackson's confidence in the results, the procedural flaws and
compromised evidence supporting Arbuthnot's conviction
ignited a bitter debate in Congress about both constitutional
authority and the law of nations, driven by Jackson's most
persistent adversary, then Speaker of the House Henry Clay.5 8
Historians have joined Clay in discerning conflict between
Arbuthnot's conviction and the premises underlying the
membership conception. 59
Secretary of State Adams invoked Vattel's conception of
neutrality in defending Jackson, asserting that the defendants
were nationals of Britain, which Adams described as preserving
its neutrality by disavowing their actions.' According to Adams,
the defendants had violated the law of nations by engaging in
violence despite their country's neutrality.16' Spain had violated
neutrality law by actively supporting their efforts.162 By
conducting war while their country sought to preserve the
peace, Adams argued, the acts of the two defendants were
analogous to the behavior of the lawless banditti that Vattel had
identified as violating the law of nations. 6 s In a move that
recalled Henry's minimalist approach to the law of nations in his
debate with Randolph on Josiah Philips, Adams insisted that
156. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 14, at 532.
157. See Message Transmitting Documents Relating to the War with the Seminole
Indians, and to the Trial and Execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister (November 18,
1818), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 681, 702 (1818).
158. See Lobel, supra note 97, at 347-48. The problems with Ambrister's execution
did not involve his guilt, since most contemporaneous and current sources agree that
he had led Native Americans in violent attacks against settlements in Georgia, and had
tolerated abuses against captives and civilians. See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREWJACKSON
AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 1767-1821 358 (1977). Questions arose,
however, because the commission imposed a sentence involving corporal punishment
and a year of hard labor, which Jackson on his own initiative vacated and replaced with
the death penalty. Id.; see also Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 14, at 532 (discussing
the episode).
159. See REMINI, supra note 158, at 352 (describing Arbuthnot's conviction as an
episode that would "hauntJackson's reputation").
160. See Adams Letter, supra note 59, at 540.
161. See id. at 539; see also Lobel, supra note 97, at 346-47.
162. Adams Letter, supra note 59, at 540-41. Each had been disavowed by Britain.
Id. at 540.
163. Id. at 544.
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Vattel would have permitted summary execution of Ambrister
and Arbuthnot.164
Henry Clay pushed back, scoffing at the notion that the
military commissions had jurisdiction over the defendants.' 65
Invoking the separation of powers, Clay noted that Congress had
not authorized military commissions for the Florida campaign.'@@
Moreover, according to Clay, the neutrality-based allegations
against Ambrister and Arbuthnot did not amount to a violation
of the law of nations. 67
On this legal point, Adams had the better argument.
Although the United States has since Washington's Neutrality
Proclamation defined the obligations of neutrality more robustly
than many other countries, Vattel's analysis of neutrality
supported that definition. Distinguished commentators and
unbroken executive branch practice buttressed Adams'
conclusion, situating it well within the zone of deference that
the Framers constructed.168
However, Clay's critique acquires fresh cogency on the
fairness of Arbuthnot's trial.'69 The truncated proceeding had at
least four critical procedural defects. First, the commission
denied Arbuthnot's motion to call Ambrister.o70 Since Ambrister
had by contemporary and historical accounts been more directly
involved in the conduct of the raids that prompted Jackson's
campaign, his testimony could have been vital for Arbuthnot's
claim that the latter had not played a role.
Second, the commission admitted crucial evidence against
Arbuthnot without a proper foundation. The government relied
164. Id.
165. See ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 517, 641; see also Rosen, supra note
14 (describing the debate).
166. See ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 644-47.
167. See generally ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 632 (asserting the
disapprobation of the proceedings in the trial and execution of Arbuthnot and
Ambrister).
168. See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 113-14 (New York, 0.
Halsted 1826) [hereinafter KENT, COMMENTARIES] (approving of United States' stance
on neutrality law); see also ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 666. Clay, in contrast,
failed to acknowledge or address Vattel's ideas, which were so central to the Framers'
understanding of the law of nations. See id. at 663-64.
169. See ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 660. Clay conceded that the case
against Ambrister, who had led cross-border raids, was strong on the facts. Id. at 641.
170. Rosen, supra note 14, at 568.
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on a memorandum on the back of one of Arbuthnot's letters to
the British ambassador to the United States. Arbuthnot's letter
merely complained of "wanton aggression" of the United States
against Native Americans.17' The memorandum on the back of
the letter was something else again. The government claimed
that the memorandum was a request written or dictated by
Native American chiefs and intended for Arbuthnot, seeking
large quantities of guns and ammunition. However, the
government never proved that the chiefs had written or dictated
the document, or offered any evidence regarding its origins.'72
Third, command influence on the commission rendered
the conviction fundamentally unfair. Jackson's lieutenant,
General Edmund Gaines, was one of the judges. Gaines had
received correspondence before the campaign from Georgia's
governor asserting that a British agent had been instigating the
transborder incursions. 7 3' As Gaines had surely come to know
before the commission was convened, Jackson believed that
Ambrister and Arbuthnot were the agents described in these
reports.174 Gaines's role in the campaign would have made it
difficult for him to acquit the person that American authorities
believed had incited his foes. Even if he had wished to, Gaines
could not have voted to acquit Arbuthnot without risking
Jackson's anger, which Gaines knew to be formidable.
Fourth, Arbuthnot's death sentence was carried out almost
immediately, precluding administrative or judicial review." The
nature and scope of judicial review of military commissions was
unsettled at this time. However, administrative review would
have permitted some opportunity to raise the issue of the other
171. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARYAFFAIRS, supra note 157, at 723.
172. Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Ambrister and Arbuthnot: Adventurers or Martyrs for British
Honor, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 289, 295 (1985); cf ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at
517-18 (Committee Report unfavorable toJackson).
173. See Letter from Gov. William Rabun to Gen. Edmund Gaines (Feb. 5, 1817),
in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 157, at 681 (warning of
influence of British agents among Seminoles and escaped slaves).
174. Id. at 701 (reporting the letter from Jackson to Secretary of War John
Calhoun, Apr. 20, 1818, and reporting on finding documents among papers of
Ambrister, Arbuthnot, and an alleged confederate "pointing out instigators of this
savage war... in some measure, involving the British Government"); id. at 702
(reporting the letter from Jackson to Calhoun, May 5, 1818, and referring to the trial
and execution of Ambrister and Arbuthnot as British agents).
175. See REMINI, supra note 158, at 358-59.
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procedural defects in the case. The thin evidence against
Arbuthnot highlighted the harshness of foreclosing this option.
Given these procedural defects, the evidence regarding
Arbuthnot's role was suspect, as Clay observed. 76 Arbuthnot,
Clay maintained, may have merely traded with Native Americans
and agreed with Clay's own view that the Treaty of Ghent
entitled Native American nations to territories lost during the
War of 1812. Indeed, the evidence against Arbuthnot was most
consistent with Clay's account. Historians have been unanimous
that Arbuthnot's diligent and futile correspondence with British
officials on behalf of the Native Americans, whom both he and
Clay regarded as victims, rendered violence "out of
character."' 77 At one point, for example, Arbuthnot informed a
former British agent for Native Americans that the British
ambassador had requested that Arbuthnot pay for the postage
on any subsequent letters describing the Native Americans'
predicament. 78 Arbuthnot meekly asked how he could apprise
British officials of the injustices done to Native Americans if the
ambassador would not even pay for letters on the subject.179 The
plaintive tenor of Arbuthnot's letter hardly befits the violent
mastermind portrayed in Jackson's accusations. The evidence
suggests that, rather than being a criminal, Arbuthnot simply
cared too much about the Native Americans' plight, believed
unwisely that the British government shared his concern, and
failed to grasp that AndrewJackson "was not a merciful man." 8 0
In convicting Arbuthnot without proof of his knowing
connection to violence, Jackson embraced the "revenge"
cautioned against by the Rutgers v. Waddington court. Adams'
defense did not dispel this impression, particularly with its broad
reading of Vattel's approval of summary execution. Adams failed
176. ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 641.
177. Owsley, supra note 172, at 304; cf DAVID S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER,
OLD HICKORY'S WAR: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE 155 (2003)
(observing that Arbuthnot's letters show "a man determined to preserve peace between
the Seminoles and the United States"); ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 633-35
(noting Henry Clay's agreement with Arbuthnot's views regarding Native American
rights under the Treaty of Ghent).
178. Letter from Alexander Arbuthnot to Col. Edward Nicholl (Aug. 27, 1817), in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 157, at 725.
179. Id.
180. See REMINI, supra note 158, at 359.
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to acknowledge that Vattel endorsed summary disposition only
when state forces were certain that a captive had methodically
and egregiously violated the law of nations. That certainty was
absent in Arbuthnot's case.
Despite Adams' insistence that any legal proceedings were
more than the law required, subsequent authorities on the law
of war have not viewed the Arbuthnot episode as precedent.
Britain cited Jackson's Seminole War commissions as precedent
for the 1837 attack in American territory on The Caroline, a vessel
allegedly used by Canadian rebels. However, a US official
countered this claim, describing Jackson's measures "has not yet
become authoritative in the code of nations."' William
Winthrop, who served in the Civil War and wrote a much-cited
nineteenth century treatise on the law of armed conflict, had
particularly harsh words on Jackson's ordering of Robert
Ambrister's execution. Noting thatJackson had disregarded the
less severe sentence handed down by the commission, Winthrop
asserted that Jackson's decision was "wholly arbitrary and
illegal."' 82 Indeed, Winthrop suggested, Jackson would as of the
writing of Winthrop's study have been "indictable for
murder." 83 Until the Court of Military Commission Review
(CMCR) sustained Salim Hamdan's conviction for material
support in 2011, no court had cited Jackson's decision. In
sustaining Hamdan's conviction, the CMCR cited another
commentator, William Birkhimer, who had deemed Jackson's
approach lawful.184 However, Birkhimer failed to address the
procedural and evidentiary flaws with Arbuthnot's trial, instead
assuming that both Arbuthnot and Ambrister were caught "red-
handed."'85 Moreover, Birkhimer based his analysis on the
proposition advanced by Adams and Patrick Henry that
181. See People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483, 557 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1841) (citing
remarks of US AttorneyJoshua Spencer); cf JOHN FABIAN WITr, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE
LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 116-17 (2012) (noting that Secretary of State
Daniel Webster advised Spencer on his arguments).
182. 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 711 (1896) (2d ed.
1896).
183. Id.
184. See WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 352-54
(3d ed. 1914); see also United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d. 1247, 1300 (Ct. Mil.
Comm'n Rev. 2011), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing to another edition of
Birkhimer's treatise).
185. BIRKHIMER, supra note 184, at 354.
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summary execution was appropriate, so that any kind of
proceeding was more than the law required.'86 Birkhimer's
analysis endorsed indicia of membership that are far narrower
than the membership conception's vision. Rejecting the voice of
humanity heeded by Vattel and the great American scholar
James Kent,187 Berkhimer urged that summary execution was
particularly appropriate for "savages."' 88 No current tribunal
should view such an account as definitive. Indeed, the citation to
Birkhimer highlights the outlier status earned by Arbuthnot's
conviction.
2. The Civil War and Military Commissions
While military commissions were used far more widely
during the Civil War than in Jackson's Florida campaign, their
use tracked the outlines of the membership conception.
Attorney General James Speed, in an opinion justifying the use
of military commissions to try individuals accused of conspiring
with John Wilkes Booth to assassinate President Lincoln,
acknowledged the Framers' view that the law of nations is "part
of the law of the land." 89 This respect for the law of nations
influenced contemporary assessments of both the discretion
accorded Congress under the Define and Punish Clause and the
role of military commissions. In addition, administrative review
provided a check on commission verdicts, supplying the
186. Id.
187. See VATTEL, supra note II, ch. 15, 151 (suggesting the importance of
humane treatment even for an enemy that is "savage" and "perfidious"); KENT,
COMMENTARIES, supra note 168, at 10-11 (arguing that laws of war also governed
treatment of non-Christian enemies).
188. See BIRKHIMER, supra note 184, at 354.
189. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297 (1865) (citing Who Privileged
From Arrest, I Op. Att'y Gen. 27 (1792)). Military commissions were also used in the
Mexican-American War. See WIrr, supra note 181, at 124-26. However, the lack of
documentation of commission proceedings in that conflict precludes definitive analysis
of their scope. Id. at 126. Mexican guerillas tried in the commissions may have been
accused of unlawful acts of violence, such as abuse of captives, which occurred
throughout the conflict. Id. at 120-21; Glazier, supra note 14, at 36. Trial for such
offenses would have raised none of the problems posed by Jackson's use of military
commissions. Moreover, surviving documentation indicates that only a handful of
Mexican nationals were tried by such tribunals; the overwhelming percentage of
commission defendants were American troops accused of a broad range of war crimes
and disciplinary offenses. Id. at 37.
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opportunity for reflection that the Framers' sought through
inter-branch separation of powers.
Attorney General Speed's opinion suggested that the
Define and Punish Clause gave Congress a limited zone of
discretion within the landscape of international law. Citing
Randolph's opinion, Speed's analysis centered on the
distinction between "defining" a norm and "making" one.o90
"To define" Speed observed, "is to give the limits or precise
meaning of a word or thing in being; to make is to call into
being. Congress has power to define, not to make, the laws of
nations"191 In contrast, Speed pointed out, "Congress has the
power to make rules for the government of the army and
navy."l 92 This textual distinction had two important
consequences. First, Speed opined, while Congress can "define"
the laws of nations, it "cannot abrogate them."'19 Quoting
Randolph, Speed asserted that Congress had the power to
"'modify [the law of nations] on some points of
indifference." 94 In other words, Congress could distill or refine
norms from the law of nations, but could not ignore those
norms. This formulation accorded Congress a measure of
deference. Speed authorized the use of military commissions to
try the Lincoln conspirators, who had abetted Booth's plan to
use civilian disguise for the assassination.195 In authorizing a
commission, Speed cited the perfidious element of the plot,
describing its participants as "secret active public enemies."'96
Although Booth apparently did not consult with Confederate
commanders, Speed readily classified Booth and his cohort as
perpetrators of a war crime, not an ordinary offense reserved for
trial in civilian courts. 9 7 This aspect of his opinion indicated
190. See Military Commissions, II Op. Att'y Gen 297 (1865).
191. Id. (emphasis in original).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 297-99.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 316-17.
197. Speed's opinion might appear to clash with the Supreme Court's decision in
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), in which the Court ruled that the Suspension
Clause barred a military commission trial for the petitioner when civilian courts were
available. However, a federal district court distinguished Milligan in denying the habeas
petition of Dr. Samuel Mudd, one of the Lincoln conspirators. See Ex parte Mudd, 17 F.
Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868). The court in Mudd held that Milligan had not addressed a
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that Speed did not read the Define and Punish Clause as unduly
restricting the definition of offenses against the law of nations.198
However, Speed's citation to Randolph's opinion and his focus
on perfidy in the Lincoln assassination suggested that Congress
lacked power to retroactively authorize commissions for conduct
that the law of war had previously permitted.
Speed's reliance on the distinction between defining under
the Define and Punish Clause and the power granted elsewhere
in Article I, section 8 to "make rules" for the armed forces had
another important consequence. Speed conceded that Congress
could invoke its war powers to establish military tribunals for the
armed forces of the United States. However, Speed continued,
Congress's war powers did not extend to creation of military
tribunals "for the adjudication of offences committed by persons
not engaged in, or belonging to, such forces."199 To authorize
these tribunals, Congress would have to rely on the Define and
Punish Clause.200 Extending Congress's power beyond the
boundaries of the law of nations would trigger the very problems
that the Framers had drafted the Constitution to prevent.201
Unmoored from the law of nations and hence from
case in which an individual in Milligan's home state of Indiana had made his way
behind the lines of a Union army camp and "not from any private animosity, but from
public reasons" had assassinated the commanding officer. According to the Mudd
court, such an act committed in the course of an armed conflict would remain a war
crime triable in a military commission. Cf WITr, supra note 181, at 291-92 (describing
evidence in the Lincoln conspirators' case, which was circumstantial but provided basis
for inferring participation in common plan); Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte
Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, reprinted in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 119-21 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A.
Bradley eds., 2009) [hereinafter Bradley, Story of Ex Parte Milligan] (discussing
litigation involving Lincoln conspirators).
198. For another example of deference to Congress, see Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. 268, 304-05 (1870), holding that congressional war power authorized confiscating
property of individuals who provided aid and comfort to the Confederacy, and that
such confiscation was also the right of belligerent under law of war. But see id. at 316-23
(Field,J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's war powers are limited by law of nations,
and that the statute at issue violated international law because it provided for forfeiture
of property without appropriate procedural safeguards); cf David Golove, The Supreme
Court, the War on Terror, and the American just War Constitutional Tradition, in
INTERNATIONAL lAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 561, 565
(David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (discussing Miller).
199. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 (1865) (emphasis added).
200. See id.
201. See id. at 299.
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membership in the international community, Americans would
devolve into an "uncivilized and barbarous people."202
The use of military commissions in the Civil War was
consistent with Speed's formulation. Commissions adjudicating
acts of violence were wary of amorphous charges. Conviction of
a defendant charged with a war crime, such as killing of civilians,
plunder of civilian property, or perfidious attacks on individuals
or strategic targets, required clear proof.20s The Lincoln
conspirators' trials, which hinged on the conspirators' assistance
to Booth's perfidious plot, met this standard. The commissions
also tried civilian defendants for regulatory offenses such as
trading with the enemy. However, these prosecutions were
predicated on defendants' breach of their duty of allegiance to
the United States and international rules governing military
occupation.20 4
Contemporary officials who established military
commissions used the tribunals for both of these purposes.205
Because of horrific violence in Missouri relatively early in the
war, General Henry Halleck, himself an expert in international
law, sought and eventually obtained authority to establish
commissions for "bushwhackers."206 These small groups, who
202. See id. at 300.
203. See U.S. War Dep't, General Orders No. 19, April 24, 1862, in I WAR OF THE
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. II, at 484-88 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office,
1894) [hereinafter 1 OR ser. II] (adjudicating the case of Ambrose R. Tompkins); cf
MARK NEELY, THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 170-71
(1991) (discussing the case of Francis M. Armstrong, in which President Lincoln
commuted Armstrong's sentence to detention for duration of war for entering Union
lines to recruit for the Confederate Army).
204. See General Court Martial Order No, 55, Feb. 3, 1865, in GENERAL COURT
MARTIAL ORDERS JANUARY-MARCH 1865 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office,
1865), available at http://ia701203.us.archive.org/25/items/generalcourtmart0Ounit/
generalcourtmart00unit.pdf (describing defendants, District of Columbia residents
convicted of trading with the enemy, as US citizens "owing allegiance" to nation); cf
Samuel T. Morison, History and Tradition in American Military justice, 33 U. PA.J. INT'L L.
121, 133-35 (2011) (discussing evolution of doctrine under law of war).
205. See generally Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil
War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2010) (discussing law of war theories that
influenced Civil War practice).
206. See General Order No. 13, Dec. 4, 1861, in I OR ser. II, supra note 203, at
233-36; see also FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO
THE ]LAW AND USAGES OF WAR 16-17 (1862) (noting nature and scope of prohibition);
cf NEELY, supra note 203, at 36-39 (noting Halleck's repeated requests for this
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took their cue from the banditti deplored by Vattel, robbed and
pillaged in the west. Halleck's order also included bridge
burners, who in sympathy with or on orders from the
Confederate command, destroyed strategic targets. Spies and
individuals trading with the enemy rounded out Halleck's list.20 7
Bushwhackers and bridge burners both displayed a
concrete link to violence that Andrew Jackson's target,
Alexander Arbuthnot, had lacked. Bushwhackers' victims were
often ordinary civilians. Attacks on civilians were war crimes,
whether such acts were committed by regular or irregular forces.
Defendants in the bridge-burning cases provided concrete aid to
a specific unlawful operation, frequently assisting in the
operations through their "presence and advice."208 Indeed, in
several of the cases cited by the government, the defendants not
only provided "aid and comfort" to groups that burned bridges,
but both plotted and participated in these acts.2 09
Although Attorney General Speed's opinion authorizing
military commissions for the Lincoln conspirators trotted out
Vattel's assertion that banditti could be summarily executed,
both experience and the weight of authority demonstrated a
commitment to more probing inquiry. Speed recommended
commission trials rather than summary execution for the
Lincoln conspirators. Other commentators also restricted the
use of summary dispositions. William Winthrop, in a widely cited
treatise written after the war that examined wartime proceedings
in detail, opined that summary dispositions were appropriate,
but only when the defendants' guilt was "clear."210 Invoking the
authority, which first met with inertia from the ever-cautious General George
McClellan, but were ultimately approved by Lincoln).
207. See General Order No. 13, Dec. 4, 1861, in I OR ser. II, supra note 203, at
233-36.
208. See, e.g., General Order No. 20, Jan. 14, 1862, in 1 OR ser. II, supra note 203,
at 403-04 (noting charges against one James R.J. Jones).
209. See id. at 404 (noting charges against one Thomas M. Smith); General Order
No. 19, in 1 OR ser. II, supra note 203, at 478 (recording that defendant Matthew
Thompson: joined band "then and there" engaged in bridge-burning and stole horse
for purpose of aiding bushwhackers); id. at 479 (recording that defendant Owen C.
Hickman engaged in assault with intent to kill).
210. WINTHROP, supra note 182, at 10-11; cf GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD
art. 82 (1863) (noting, in groundbreaking code by Francis Lieber, that those who fight,
plunder, etc., "without commission, without being part... of the organized hostile
army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting
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legality of summary execution was more a rhetorical trope than
a reflection of reality. In the vast run of cases, defendants
received a trial with meaningful procedural safeguards. The
proof is in the pudding: Missouri was the scene of extraordinary
violence during the war, and was also the site of almost half of
the over 4,000 military commissions during the conflict.2 1' In a
representative sample of the Missouri proceedings, acquittals
occurred in nearly fifteen percent of the contested cases and
administrative review of the sentence produced commutations
in another forty percent of such matters.2 12
Commissions also generally avoided the vague charges that
marred Jackson's military commission trial of Alexander
Arbuthnot. In practice, as noted above, commissions issued
serious punishments such as death or substantial imprisonment
only on findings of concrete involvement in violence. When
commissions dispensed such punishments for more amorphous
conduct, such as violation of an oath of allegiance to the Union
and recruitment for the Confederacy behind Union lines,
administrative review typically commuted the sentence.21 3
Commissions did sometimes target individuals because of anti-
government opinions.214 In retrospect, these prosecutions are
problematic, particularly given the robust view of political
speech embodied in modern First Amendment jurisprudence. 215
However, vigorous criticism of the administration continued
returns to their homes and avocations ... are not public enemies . .. and are not
entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway
robbers or pirates").
211. SeeNEELY, supra note 203, at 168.
212. See id. at 43.
213. See id. at 170-71 (noting that in this case, the Judge Advocate General argued
for upholding death penalty, but Lincoln commuted sentence).
214. The most famous case involved Ohio politician Clement Vallandigham,
whose sentence Lincoln commuted to banishment to the Confederacy. See id. at 65-68;
Bradley, Story ofEx parte Milligan, supra note 197, at 104-05; cf Paul Finkelman, Civil
Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353,
1360-61 (1993) (book review) (offering more critical perspective); see also Ex parte
Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 251-52 (1864) (dismissing Vallandigham's challenge to his
conviction on procedural grounds, contending that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari to a military commission, but failing to address whether a challenge could
have been construed by Court as writ of habeas corpus seeking original jurisdiction).
215. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION AcT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
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throughout the conflict, and the prosecutions were a small
portion of the commissions' total output.216
The noted law of war authority Winthrop contradicted
Attorney General Speed on another key point. Speed had
argued that the offense of bushwhacking was complete upon the
defendant's joining of a group.217 Speed's view would have
permitted far more cursory review of the defendant's conduct.
However, Winthrop's perusal of Civil War precedent convinced
him that more was necessary. Winthrop opined that "overt acts,"
not mere intentions, were required.218 The cases cited above
again bear out Winthrop's view.
Review by generals like Halleck or by President Lincoln
himself helped temper military commission dispositions,
substituting for the more formal review that an Article III court
might have provided. Layers of review unearthed procedural
irregularities and introduced mercy into decisions that might
otherwise have been unduly harsh.219 This mechanism did some
of the work of the separation of powers that Montesquieu and
the Framers had contemplated, bringing to bear a long-term
perspective and curbing the tendency for revenge. Lincoln's
concern with underlying facts echoed Randolph's temperate
position in the debate with Patrick Henry about Josiah Phillips'
treatment220 and contrasted with Jackson's rush to judgment in
the Florida campaign.22 1
216. See NEELY, supra note 203, at 44 (asserting that "[t]rials by military
commission did not often serve the purpose of repression for political opinion").
217. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 312 (1865).
218. See WINTHROP, supra note 182, at 73-74.
219. See Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military
Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REv. 13, 88-90 (1990) (analyzing Lincoln's review of military
commission verdicts regarding members of the Dakota nation who had allegedly killed
captives and targeted civilians for killing and sexual violence). The Lincoln
administration was careful to comply with international law in other respects, including
the treatment of blockade-runners. See David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International
Law Where it Is: Goldsmith and Posner's The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 333, 364-70 (2006).
220. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 155-88.
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3. Defining and Punishing Piracy and Counterfeiting under
Federal Criminal Law
While Andrew Jackson and Civil War officials acted
independently of Congress, court cases starting in the
nineteenth century directly considered Congress's powers.
Courts served the membership conception by deferring to
Congress when individuals' short-term impulses jeopardized
global commercial interests. While the Court ceded a zone of
discretion to Congress regarding the definition of individual
conduct that undermined membership, it also imposed limits.
Justice Story, in his opinion for the Court in United States v.
Smith,222 agreed that Congress acted within its authority under
the Define and Punish Clause when it enacted a statute
criminalizing piracy. The Framers had expressly granted
Congress power to define and punish the offense of piracy,
which Madison acknowledged in Federalist No. 42 was also an
offense under international law.22 1 Piracy was a danger because it
attacked commerce between nations, which European
philosophers had designated as a crucial force for tempering
short-term impulses.224 States increasingly had mechanisms for
accountability that promoted a long-term perspective, including
governing institutions, a "civil society" of associations between
citizens, and the reciprocity between nations that helped to
enforce international law. Pirates, in contrast, were
"unconnected individuals." 225 Pirates' own deliberations, such as
they were, partook of short-term impulses for gain and
notoriety. In permitting those short-term impulses full sway,
pirates became the "enemies of mankind."22 6 Enhancing the
community of nations' ability to address this danger was an
important element of the Framers' conception of membership.
In responding to this need, Story wrote, Congress was
entitled to some deference. In the statute at issue in Smith,
Congress had not specified particular acts as triggering criminal
penalties, but had incorporated by reference the international
jurisprudence outlawing piracy. Story endorsed Congress's
222. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
223. See Federalist No. 42, supra note 1, at 266.
224. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 36 at 60 (citing Montesquieu).
225. Smith, 18 U.S. at 163 n.8.
226. Id.
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reliance on international law to fill in the gaps, observing that
customary international law was too vast and various to be
"completely ascertained and defined in any public code
recognized by the common consent of nations."227 Because a
comprehensive international code was not practicable, granting
Congress the flexibility to fill in interstices fit the Framers'
design.228 As a representative institution with the ability to
investigate facts and arrive at solutions tailored to the tenor of
the times, Congress was well situated to discharge this task.229
In the piracy cases, the Court set limits only when the
United States had no demonstrable interest in regulation. For
example, in United States v. Palmer,230 the Court indicated that
Congress would have to state clearly that it wished to prohibit
thefts on the high seas that did not involve citizens or United
States flag vessels.23' One case from the period, United States v.
Furlong,23 2 imposed a limit on Congress's power by holding that
Congress could not criminalize the murder of one member of a
pirate ship's crew by another.233 However, as we shall see, this
case relied on idiosyncratic reasoning that cut against the grain
of more recent international law,2 34 and in any case imposed
only a modest limit on Congress's authority.2 35
227. Id. at 159; cf United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d189, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (citing Smith for proposition that Congress has complied with the Define and
Punish Clause if "at least some members of the international community" regard
particular conduct as violation of international law).
228. See Smith, 18 U.S. at 159 (asserting that the wisdom of deferring to Congress
surely carried "great weight" with the Framers).
229. Id. (noting a "peculiar fitness in giving the power to define as well as to
punish" to Congress).
230. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 630-35 (1818).
231. Cf Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 226 (2004) (explaining rationale in the
cases).
232. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.. ) 184 (1820).
233. Id. at 195.
234. See Helfman, supra note 100, at 65 n.75; Kontorovich, supra note 231, at 204-
05 (acknowledging this point, while critiquing normative basis for subsequent
expansion of universal jurisdiction under international law).
235. In The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall
observed that state bans of the slave trade had not yet ripened into a rule of
international law. Marshall's analysis hinted strongly that Congress's power was not
limitless. See id. at 122 (asserting that, "[a]s no nation can prescribe a rule for others,
none can make a law of nations, and ... [the slave trade] remains lawful to those whose
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Later in the nineteenth century, the Court applied
comparable deference to Congress's efforts to deal with
international counterfeiting in United States v. Aijona.23 6 In
Arjona, the Court held that Congress had acted within its power
under the Define and Punish Clause when it passed a law
criminalizing the manufacturing of counterfeit foreign
currencies within the United States for use in a foreign state.
Just as pirates undermined trade by preying on international
shipping, counterfeiters' greed undermined the long-term
global good of "wise and equitable commercial laws."28 7 The
membership conception required that each state take action to
ward off this risk. Echoing the expansive view of neutrality law
that had been so important in the debates about Washington's
Proclamation and Jackson's military commissions during the
Florida campaign, the Court cited Vattel for the proposition
that, "The law of nations requires every national government to
use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done within its own
dominion to another nation with which it is at peace."2 M While
the Court observed that Congress's determination that a given
act violated the law of nations was subject to judicial review,8 9 its
analysis reinforced the validity of reasonable efforts by Congress
to fulfill the United States' international obligations.2'
4. World War II: Espionage, Sabotage, and the Quirin Case
In the twentieth century, the foremost precedent on the
Define and Punish Clause, Ex parte Quiin, continued this
governments have not forbidden it"). However, this portion of the analysis was dicta, as
the case did not address Congress's power under the Define and Punish Clause.
236. United States v. Aijona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887).
237. Id. at 484.
238. Id. at 484; cf Kontorovich, Discretion and Delegation, supra note 84, at 1727-30
(acknowledging this rationale, while finding it to be "strained" interpretation that
confers excessive power on Congress).
239. Aijona, 120 U.S. at 488 ("Whether the offense as defined is an offense against
the law of nations depends on the thing done, not on any declaration to that effect by
congress.").
240. Cf Thomas H. Lee & David L. Sloss, International Law an Interpretive Tool in
the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
CONTINUnY AND CHANGE, supra note 198, at 124, 147-48 (noting that the Aijona Court
relied mainly on Vattel and policy, without citing treaties, state practice, or other
publicists).
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pattern of deference.24' Quiin addressed Congress's power to
define and punish espionage and sabotage in a case involving
individuals who disembarked from submarines on the eastern
coast of the United States. The Court suggested that Congress
could authorize military commissions to try individuals charged
with espionage or sabotage, even though the former has an
ambiguous status under international law and the defendants
had not consummated the acts normally required for the
latter.242
Because both sabotage and espionage have long
pedigrees,243 the Court took a less formal view of the
requirements of the separation of powers. According to the
Court, express congressional authorization of each charge was
unnecessary, because Congress had implicitly included2 "
offenses historically triable by military commissions. The
241. See generally Ex Parte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The United States also
applied military law in territories acquired after the Spanish-American War. See Andrew
Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court's Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97
IOWA L. REv. 101, 143 (2011). While the Supreme Court on occasion expressed
deference to military tribunals, cases generally involved either violations of the law of
war or conduct that undermined the military administration's ability to fulfill its
international law duties as an occupying authority. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109,
121-23 (1901) (upholding military court's jurisdiction over US official who had
allegedly embezzled funds from US-run postal service in Cuba). When military
administrators issued orders that appeared to treat civilians unfairly, the Court
intervened to temper those effects. See Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139, 162-64
(1913) (construing military order governing disposition of property to provide
opportunity for hearing). See id. at 165 (asserting that military orders applicable to
civilians should follow "general rules of international law and . .. fundamental
principles known wherever the American flag flies").
242. All members of the group were convicted. Two defendants, who after their entry
into the United States informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the group's
plans, ultimately had their sentences commuted. See Louis FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON
TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 175 (2003). The rest were executed.
Adding to the controversy around the decision, the executions occurred before issuance
of the Court's full decision upholding the convictions. SeeJonathan Turley, Trials and
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 739 (2002) (noting that the Court released a preliminary
decision "with the promise of an opinion at a later date"). For different views of the
case, compare A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REV.
309, 310 (contending that Quirin, along with changes in law of habeas corpus, provides
significant protection for defendants in military tribunals), with Turley, supra note 242,
at 734-40 (criticizing Quirin).
243. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 12-14 (asserting that Congress had "incorporated by
reference" all such offenses).
244. Id. at 12 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820)).
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extensive pedigree of each charge presumably also influenced
the Court's view that Congress had authorized military
commissions in such cases. The provision of the Espionage Act
that the Court relied on to demonstrate congressional
authorization, 50 U.S.C. § 38, actually read more like a savings
clause.245 A savings clause does not grant jurisdiction or other
authority, but merely declares that Congress has not intended to
limit jurisdiction or other authority that already exists. In
retrospect, Congress appears to have acquiesced in a long
pattern of executive branch usage regarding the trial of sabotage
and espionage charges.246
Spying has long been an offense triable by military
commission. In the Revolutionary War, General Washington
convened a military commission to try Major John Andre..
Andre had been captured behind American lines in civilian garb
after a meeting with General Benedict Arnold, whom Andre was
persuading to defect to the British.247 Henry Clay, who so
vigorously condemned Jackson for the military commissions that
convicted Ambrister and Arbuthnot in the Florida campaign,
agreed that spying was a violation of the laws of war.24 General
Halleck, author of one of the best-known international law
treatises of the day, noted that spying involving "disguise, or false
pretence . . . constitutes . . . perfidy" punishable by death.249
However, ambiguity about the precise status of espionage is not
far from the surface.
245. Id. at 10; see generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional
Limit on Military Commission Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 295 (2010)
(discussing ambiguities in statute).
246. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
Uackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing
legislative acquiescence as triggeringjudicial deference); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec.
2012) (analyzing patterns of acquiescence); see generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding presidential negotiation of claims settlement with Iran); cf
WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURlY LAW AND THE POWER
OF THE PURSE 121-29 (Oxford University Press 1994) (discussing what authors call
"customary national security law") .
247. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 n.9; I HENRY WAGNER HALLECK, HALLECK'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND
WAR (Sherston Baker ed., 3rd ed. 1893).
248. ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 155, at 644-46.
249. HALLECK, supra note 247, at 572 (emphasis in original).
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Twentieth century authority suggests at the very least that
espionage is not a war crime like killing civilians, and may
merely be a violation of municipal law that international law
permits nations to prosecute. Nuremberg prosecutor Telford
Taylor recognized in his Final Report that espionage was an
offense against the law of nations, although he did not view it as
a war crime in the same sense as the targeting of civilians.2 0
International agreements like the Hague Convention defined
espionage as acting "clandestinely or on false pretences" in
order to procure information.25 ' However, neither the Hague
Convention nor subsequent agreements prohibit espionage,
although they clearly indicate that states have the legal right to
punish it.252
Under the deference that the membership conception
grants Congress, the exact status of espionage under
international law is less important than the near-universal
tradition of trying espionage in military commissions or dealing
with accused spies by summary execution. Modern international
law bars the latter practice, requiring that an accused spy receive
a trial.253 However, modern doctrine does not preclude the use
of military commissions.
Ultimately, espionage fits best under the rubric of offenses
that a military authority can try and punish to maintain order in
territory it occupies or controls.254 The deception practiced by
250. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 1-2 (1949)
[hereinafter WAR CRIME TRIALS] available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/
pdf/NTfinal-report.pdf (distinguishing "'noncriminal' offenses against the laws of war
(such as espionage) from 'criminal' offenses such as atrocities against civilians").
251. See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
252. Id. art. 30 (mandating that accused spy "shall not be punished
without ... trial"). See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies,
Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 328-29 (1951) (expressing doubt that
espionage is violation of law of nations); cf John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the
Application of a Municipal Offence: The Common Law Origins of 'Murder in Violation of the
Law of War, 7J. INT'L CRIM.JUsT. 63,73-79 (2009) (elaborating on Baxter's view).
253. See Hague Regulations, supra note 251, art 30.
254. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952) (upholding use of military
commission in occupied Germany to try civilian wife for murder of service member
spouse); cf United States v. Ali, 2012 CAAF Lexis 815, at *17-24 (C.A.A.F. July 18,
2012) (upholding military commission jurisdiction over foreign national translator
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spies ripples to civilians. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
Quirin, spies often turn to sabotage. 255 Spies may also recruit
supporters from a state's population, weakening the ties that
bind the state and its citizens. The spy's cultivation of secrecy
makes these effects even harder to detect. Moreover, a spy's
transmittal of strategic and tactical information aids the enemy,
perhaps even more effectively than measures such as trading
food or ammunition. The desire to control these untoward
effects is entirely consistent with the authority provided to
Congress under the Define and Punish Clause. Quirin's flexible
view of Congress's authority under the Clause is not an outlier,
but a point on the continuum first noted by the Justice Story'
opinion over a century earlier in Smith. Indeed, the Quifin
Court's approach echoed 'the Court in Smith, as it rejected any
effort to hamstring Congress with an unduly "meticulous"
demarcation of the law of nations' "ultimate boundaries." 256
The Court's holding on sabotage is an even clearer
indication of deference. While few if any scholars have
expressed doubt that the defendants intended to commit acts of
sabotage, the accused saboteurs made little progress toward
realizing that goal. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the
defendants' argument that they had not executed or even
attempted any acts of sabotage.25 7 Instead, the Court in effect
extended the temporal scope of the prohibition on sabotage,
holding that the defendants' entry into US territory with the
intent to commit sabotage rendered their offense "complete."25 8
The Court obviously viewed such a modification as within
Congress's power under the Define and Punish Clause.
"serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field"); id. at *59-60 (Baker, J.,
concurring) (observing that providing for jurisdiction was necessary and appropriate
exercise of congressional war powers, since inability to discipline foreign national
performing mission-critical function could undermine war effort).
255. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.10.
256. Id. at 45-46.
257. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; cf Kontorovich, Discretion and Delegation, supra note 84,
at 1735 (noting that the Court "recognized that the parameters of international law
could be vague," and that Congress therefore deserved some deference in fixing those
parameters).
258. Id.; cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (citing this holding with approval).
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5. Nuremberg and Membership Offenses
The Nuremberg tribunals after World War II reflected a
strong victory for the membership conception. Fittingly enough,
the relevant precedents from Nuremberg entailed the trial of
"membership offenses."259 Although this category could have
been sweepingly broad, American officials worked with their
European colleagues to tailor the definition.
Because the Nuremberg prosecutors recognized early on
(with some prodding from the Nuremberg judges2 o) that
membership in a criminal organization like the Nazi SS was an
unduly amorphous basis for guilt, prosecutors defined
membership offenses to include two relatively narrow categories
of conduct.261 The first comprised individuals who played
substantial roles in murderous organizations such as the SS. The
second involved individuals who, much like members of the
bushwhackers during the Civil War, participated in relatively
small groups that committed acts of violence against civilians.
The narrow categories promoted notice for potential defendants
and precluded use of the tribunals as a blunt instrument of
revenge.
The first category included defendants Flick and
Steinbrinck, charter members of the quaint group, "Friends of
Himmler." The defendants knowingly provided a "blank check"
for the gruesome operation of the psychopathic SS chief.262 The
second category, entailing direct complicity in war crimes,
largely concerned members of German military units known as
einsatzgruppen that killed hundreds of thousands of
noncombatants. 269 Here, however, as in the Civil War bridge
259. See TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 272-85 (1992); Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy
in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094
(2009).
260. See TAYLOR, supra note 259, at 280-83.
261. See Bush, supra note 259, at 1161 (noting that prosecutors recognized that for
legal, political, and practical reasons they could not use membership offense charges to
try "average complicitous Germans").
262. 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1221 (Sept. 16 2012), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/NTwar-criminalsVol-VI.pdf.
263. See generally CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE
BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND 18-25 (1998) (describing history
of one typical Einsatzgruppen unit).
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burning cases, the Nuremberg tribunals were lenient with
defendants who did not play a concrete role in furthering
unlawful violence.264 The tailoring done by the American
prosecutors thus combined accountability with respect for
procedural safeguards.
6. After September 11: Salim Hamdan and Conspiracy
The membership conception's fear of short-term impulse
also drove the Court's 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld265,
restricting the President's power to unilaterally create military
commissions.26 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, suggested
that President Bush's post-9/11 order creating military
commissions lacked the sober second thoughts that
characterized the Nuremberg prosecutors' efforts to limit the
scope of membership offenses.267 Drafted without congressional
buy-in or the procedural safeguards required by the Geneva
Convention's Common Article 3, the executive order threatened
to sacrifice adjudication on the altar of revenge. However,
Hamdan also suggests that a more tailored measure passed by
Congress pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause would pass
muster.
264. See generally 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 584-87 (Sept. 16 2012) (hereinafter
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_.aw/pdf/
NThwar-criminalsVol-IV.pdf (showing a case of a noncommissioned officer Mathias
Graf, who sought repeatedly to leave his unit and was sentenced to time served).
265. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
266. Compare Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda
Terrorists?. A Quakfied Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 613-20 (2002) (arguing
that military tribunals are appropriate under international law), andJack L. Goldsmith
& Curtis A. Bradley, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 249
(2002) (arguing for validity of Administration's Military Order establishing military
tribunals), with Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that congressional
authorization was required), and Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When
justice Goes to War. Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2002) (expressing concerns about command influence).
267. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 601-02 (suggesting that unilateral presidential action in
this context could lead to despotic rule); Deborah Pearlstein, justice Stevens and the
Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1310-11 (2011) (discussing factors that contributed
to justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Hamdan).
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One portion of Justice Stevens' opinion asserted that the
military commission established by the President could not try
Hamdan, who had served as Osama bin Laden's driver, on
charges that he conspired to join Al Qaeda in killing civilians
and committing other war crimes.26* The section of Stevens'
opinion addressing conspiracy cites the same concern with
separation of powers that led the Court to decisively reject
President Bush's unilateral attempt to establish commissions. 269
Stevens quoted the argument in Federalist No. 47 for separate
but overlapping powers, in which Madison warned that,
"Accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."270 While
the "evolutionary" common law tradition of the law of war271
would permit some executive branch designation of conduct as
triable by military commission, precedent under the law of
nations for such designation would have to be "plain and
unambiguous."272 Stevens expressly declined to consider
268. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 601-02. The tally was 4-3 on this issue, with Justice
Kennedy declining to join the opinion; ChiefJustice Roberts recused himself because
he had been part of the panel that heard the case in the D.C. Circuit. The make-up of
the plurality alone provides some basis for uncertainty about the vitality of the opinion,
at least insofar as it suggests absolute limits on military commission jurisdiction. Justice
Kennedy, explaining his refusal to join this part of Stevens' opinion, found it
unnecessary to address the validity of conspiracy charges. Id. at 655. Kennedy noted
further that, on the general question of determining whether a given charge can be
tried in a commission, "Congress, not the Court, is the branch in the better position to
undertake the 'sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or international justice.'" Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
269. These concerns have also driven case law and scholarly debate on detention.
See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (citing separation of powers
in striking down limits on detainees' access to habeas corpus); Joseph Landau, Muscular
Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661
(2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has used procedural rulings in terrorism cases
to police interaction between the branches), Martin S. Flaherty, Constitutional Resolve in
a World Changed Utterly, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
CONTINUrlY AND CHANGE, supra note 198 at 575, 578-80 (analyzing judicial review in
war on terror cases); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and
the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2125-35 (2009) (discussing
historical background).
270. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 602.
271. Id. at 602 n.34.
272. Id. at 602-03. For Stevens, the crimes of sabotage and espionage at issue in
Quirin met this standard. See id. at 603 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30, 35-36).
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whether legislation enacted pursuant to the Define and Punish
Clause was subject to the same restriction.273
Stevens also viewed separation of powers as a signal of long-
term perspective in his discussion of the Nuremberg
membership offense prosecutions. Stevens' opinion noted that
the prosecutions stemmed from provisions in the London
Charter through which the Allied Powers established the
tribunals.274 Charges based on membership in a criminal
organization like the SS were not a mere whim of the
prosecutors, and were therefore entitled to greater respect.275
Furthermore, Stevens' opinion tracked the membership
conception in seeking a link between a defendant and concrete
actions that violated the law of war. Stevens recognized that the
Civil War precedents generally entailed specific crimes, rather
than mere membership in a particular unit.2 76 In addition, he
noted that the Nuremberg prosecutors had tailored
membership offenses to avoid "mass . . . trials" and instead had
focused on "high-level Nazi officials."277
Two aspects of Stevens' plurality opinion on conspiracy
suggest that he would have extended greater deference to
congressional authorization of material support charges. First,
much of Stevens' discussion stressed the dangers of executive
unilateralism.278 That persistent theme and Stevens' careful
reservation of issues regarding Congress's exercise of its
enumerated power under the Define and Punish Clause hinted
that agreement between the political branches should trigger
greater deference. Stevens also praised the Quiin Court's
approach, including its handling of the espionage and sabotage
charges.279 As we have noted, the Quirin Court's analysis of these
issues discounted problems with the international law status of
espionage and the temporal scope of sabotage.28s Finding each
of these charges to be within Congress's power under the Define
273. Id. at 601.




278. Id. at 601-02.
279. Id. at 603-07.
280. See supra notes 241-58 and accompanying text, discussing Quirin, 317 U.S. at
31-38.
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and Punish Clause requires the measure of deference to
Congress that the membership conception contemplates.
7. Summary
The membership conception dominates the period from
Jackson's Florida campaign to the present. The piracy cases and
Ar/ona illustrated the zone of deference that courts accorded
Congress in policing individual misconduct that threatened
cooperation among nations. From the military commissions in
Missouri during the Civil War to the Nuremberg prosecutors'
tailoring of membership offenses, officials resisted or rethought
the short-term impulse for revenge.
This narrative is not monolithic. Military commission
jurisdiction was pushed beyond the breaking point byJackson in
his use of a military commission to try Alexander Arbuthnot.
During the Civil War, Clement Vallandigham's military
commission conviction for speech critical of government policy
was another challenge to the membership conception. However,
these excesses always encountered robust pushback. Henry Clay
denounced Arbuthnot's trial and execution, triggering a
sustained and serious debate on the law of nations. Responding
to a comparable level of controversy, Lincoln commuted
Vallandigham's sentence. Vallandigham's conviction was in any
case an outlier among military commission convictions, which
typically centered on participation in unlawful acts of violence.
Ex parte Quirin and the post-9/11 jurisprudence tell the
same tale. As Justice Stevens noted decades later in Hamdan, the
law of war presented sufficient precedent for military
commission jurisdiction over the charges of espionage and
sabotage in the Quifin case. The commutation of sentences of
the two defendants who had tipped off the FBI showed the sober
second thoughts that have always typified the membership
conception. Hamdan itself, with its rejection of executive
unilateralism and embrace of the procedural safeguards in the
Geneva Convention's Common Article 3, displayed the
membership conception's fortitude in the crucible of post 9/11
fears. However, Hamdan's case and that of another
Guantanamo detainee, Ali Hamza al Bahlul, posed a fresh
challenge, to which we now turn.
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IV. INVITATION TO A PROBLEM: MATERIAL SUPPORT LAWS
AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS
After the Supreme Court struck down President Bush's
efforts to unilaterally establish military commissions, Congress
joined the fray with the Military Commission Act of 2006. The
2006 MCA included material support of terrorism as a charge
triable before military commissions. A broad definition of
material support would reach a great deal of conduct that the
law of war does not prohibit, exceeding the measure of
deference that the membership approach requires. This section
first provides some background on the application of material
support charges pursuant to federal criminal law, and then
discusses the arguments made by the government and its critics
in the two military commission cases currently before the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
A. Material Support and Federal Criminal Law
Congress first enacted laws barring material support of
terrorism as provisions of the Federal Criminal Code. The first
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, passed in 1994, bars material
support of terrorist activity.28' After the Oklahoma City
bombing, Congress passed section 2339B, which bars material
support of terrorist groups, such as Hamas.28 2 Section 2339A
requires proof that a defendant specifically intended to promote
attacks on persons or property. In contrast, section 2339B bars
any contribution of material support to groups that the
Secretary of State has designated as foreign terrorist
organizations (DFTOs). Under section 2339B, a defendant need
not intend to further violence, as long as he knows that he is
providing support to a DFTO. Courts construing section 2339B
have uniformly upheld Congress's view that DFTOs, like state
sponsors of terrorism, "are so tainted by their criminal conduct
281. Material support covers a broad range of activities, including tangible items,
such as explosives and weapons, and intangible items, such as financial and other
services, personnel, training, and expert advice or assistance. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994).
See also Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands
of Prevention, 42 HARv. J. ON LECIS. 1, 12-18 (2005) (discussing the history of the
statute); Margulies, Advising Terrorism, supra note 112.
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
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that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct." 281
After September 11, the government used the material
support laws in efforts to deter terrorist conspiracies and disrupt
terrorist attacks before they reached a critical stage. 284 Relying
heavily on the government's special competence in the realm of
foreign affairs, the Supreme Court upheld § 2339B in 2010,
rejecting vagueness and First Amendment challenges.285 Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for a 6-3 majority that included Justice
Stevens, explained that § 2339B survived heightened scrutiny
because support had to be "coordinated with" the DFTO.'"
Even training in nonviolence provided in coordination with a
DFTO would violate the statute, Roberts observed, because a
terrorist group could use that training to present a kinder,
gentler face to the world and raise more money to support
violence.287
To tailor the statute to core First Amendment interests, the
Court observed that the statute did not prohibit individuals from
expressing an independent opinion that happened to coincide
with views expressed by a DFTO.288 A sensible reading of the
statute would also exempt scholarship, journalism, human rights
monitoring, legal advocacy, and mediation a la the Carter
Center.289 Moreover, the statute does not cover domestic
organizations.2 Nevertheless, both the statute and the Supreme
Court's decision upholding it have drawn a significant amount
of criticism.2 9 ' Even more importantly for the purposes of this
283. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 301 (a) (7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1246 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2006))
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-25 (2010) (upholding the
statute).
284. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS-2009 UPDATE AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 13-16 (2009) (discussing prosecutions and noting that prosecutors
have been successful in obtaining convictions).
285. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2719-21.
286. Id. at 2721-22.
287. Id. at 2729-30.
288. Id. at 2722-23.
289. See Margulies, Advising Terrorism, supra note 112, at 506-12 (arguing that this
reading of the statute is consistent with constitutional precedent).
290. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2730.
291. See David Cole, The First Amendment's Borders: The Place of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 147
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Article, the provision reaches acts such as low-level financial
support and nonviolent training that have never been
considered violations of the law of war.292
B. Material Support Moves to Military Commissions
Congress also believed that material support charges were
triable before military commissions. When Congress codified
crimes triable before commissions in the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 (MCA), it included material support to terrorism as
one of the charges authorized.2 " Although the Obama
administration expressed doubt that Congress had the power to
authorize military commission trials of material support
charges,294 Congress also included material support in the MCA
of 2009.2"
Since the 2006 MCA became law five years after September
11, it may seem odd to attribute its enactment to the short-term
impulses that the Framers feared. However, the law was passed
hastily, as a response to the Supreme Court's 2006 Hamdan
(2012); Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court's Construction of
Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455 (2011); Amanda Shanor, Beyond Humanitarian Law
Project: Promoting Human Rights in a Post-9/11 World, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
519 (2011); Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Perspective, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 966-69 (2011); cf Steven R. Morrison,
Terrorism Online: Is Speech the Same As It Ever Was?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REv. 963 (2011)
(warning of threat to First Amendment in prosecution under material support law of
online terrorist recruitment).
292. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Understanding the Limitations on Invoking the Courts-
Martial Option for Trying Captured Terrorists, 17 WILLAMETTEJ. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES.
1, 18 (2009). Corn has taken a more textured position, suggesting that Congress could
prospectively provide for trial of material support charges in military commissions.
Corn. Id. at 18. Cf Stephen I. Vladeck, On jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 172, 179-80 (2008) (analyzing problems with trying
material support cases in military commissions).
293. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950v(b) (28),
120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.§§948a-950w (2006)), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf, replaced by Military
Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2012).
294. See, e.g., Hearing of the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Proposals for Reform of the Military
Commissions System, Fed. News Service, July 30, 2009 (hereinafter Proposals for Reform
Hearing) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General David Kris).
295. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2012).
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decision striking down presidentially established commissions." 6
Moreover, other provisions of the law, especially its curbing of
habeas corpus for detainees, displayed the lack of deliberation
that had disturbed Hamilton in Federalist No. 78. As Justice
Kennedy wrote in his opinion for the Court in Boumediene v.
Bush,297 the curbs on habeas demonstrated the volatility that
occurs when the political branches expect no challenge from
the courts. Kennedy warned of the "pendular swings" that occur
in the absence of separation of powers.298 Kennedy's concern
about reflection's absence in the MCA could just as easily apply
to the law's provisions on material support.
Two active cases currently before the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit involve challenges
to the military commissions' jurisdiction over charges of
material support. In one case, a military commission convicted
Salim Hamdan, best known as Osama bin Laden's driver in the
period surrounding the September 11 attacks. 299 In the other
case, a commission convicted Ali Hamza al Bahlul, who served as
media secretary for bin Laden, and in that capacity prepared a
video celebrating the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and
296. Cf Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law" and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 760, 765-70 (2006) (analyzing Hamdan as indicating Court's commitment
to procedural safeguards).
297. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see also Jared A. Goldstein,
Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 1165 (arguing that habeas provides vital check
on political branches); cf Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding
Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CAL. L. REV. 301 (2009) (arguing that judicially
imposed rules are necessary to compensate for short-sighted executive policies); Daniel
J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2009
Sup. CT. REV. 1 (2008) (praising the decision); David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders:
Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2007); But
see Charles A. Shanor, Terrorism, Historical Analogies, and Modern Choices, 24 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 589, 607-12 (2010) (discussing post-Boumediene D.C. Circuit cases that limited
impact of Supreme Court's holding by shifting burden to detainee upon government's
showing of "credible evidence" to warrant detention); Eric A. Posner, International Law
and the War on Terror: Boumediene and the Uncertain March ofJudicial Cosmopolitanism,
CATO Sup. Cr. REv. 23, 39-46 (2007) (criticizing decision as unmanageable and
illegitimate extension of protection of American law to noncitizens not on American
soil).
298. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742.
299. Hamdan was also found guilty of providing weapons to the Taliban and
fellow Al Qaeda operatives, although not in connection with any specific attack. United
States v. Hamdan (Hamdan 1), 801 F. Supp. 2d. 1247, 1247( Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev.
2011).
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distributed the "martyr's wills" of two of the September 11
hijackers.soo Each of these convictions has been upheld by the
Court of Military Commission Review ("CMCR");3' the D.C.
Court of Appeals recently reversed the CMCR in Hamdan and
argument is pending in that court in al BahluL It seems quite
possible, given the importance of the questions presented, that
at least one of the cases will eventually reach the United States
Supreme Court.
1. The Court of Military Commission Review Decisions
The CMCR decisions in Hamdan and al Bahlul took a broad
view of prosecutions under the law of armed conflict, which
clashes with the membership conception and to some degree
has been overtaken by certain events. Although, as we have seen,
the Civil War and Nuremberg precedents are best read narrowly,
the CMCR construed them as applying in a sweeping fashion to
almost any assistance provided to Al Qaeda.302 Moreover, the
CMCR viewed Jackson's military commission for Arbuthnot as a
precedent, not a cautionary tale. As a result, even the
government has opted to change the terrain in defending the
convictions.
The CMCR's analysis does not bring Hamdan's conviction
within the fabric of the law of war. Consider the CMCR's
treatment of the Civil War precedents. The bushwhackers and
bridge burners prosecuted by commissions participated directly
in violence. None of the cases involved a defendant like
Hamdan, who performed ministerial tasks several steps removed
from the operational planning or execution of a terrorist plot.
The aiding the enemy cases involved US citizens with a duty of
loyalty to the US which Hamdan does not share. The
Nuremberg membership offense cases303 similarly support
liability only for a defendant who played a substantial role in a
300. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2dl141 (Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev.. Sept.
9,2011).
301. Hamdan 1, 801 F. Supp. 2d.at 1247 (Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. 2011); rev'd,
Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan 11), 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v.
Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2di141, 1141-42 ( Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. 2011).
302. Hamdan 1, 801 F. Supp. 2d. at 1294-1301; cf Peter Margulies, The Fog of War
Reform: Structure and Change in the Law ofArmed Conflict After Sept. I1, 95 MARQUETTE L.
REV. 1417, 1477-84 (2012) (critiquing decision).
303. Hamdan I, 801 F. Supp. 2d. at 1306.
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murderous organization like the SS or served in a small unit like
the einsatzgruppen dedicated to the killing of civilians. Hamdan
meets neither of these criteria. Finally, the Joint Criminal
Enterprise (JCE) theory used by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 304 also does not fit
Hamdan's conduct. In Prosecutor v. Tadic,"5 the ICTY tied JCE,
which is still controversial,? 6 to direct participation in forced
removal of village residents that resulted in the murder of
civilians.307 Here, too, Hamdan's conduct did not rise to the
level that the standard requires. That leaves Jackson's
commission for Arbuthnot. Arbuthnot's repeated efforts to
advocate for Native Americans foreshadowed the acts which the
Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project held could
be prosecuted criminally if done in coordination with a DFTO.
However, Jackson's commission has attracted only modest
support in case law and scholarship. 08
Because the CMCR's broad reading of precedents is
difficult to sustain, the government has taken a different
approach in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The
government's current position does not abandon arguments
under the Define and Punish Clause. However, the government
has shifted its emphasis to a new theory that posits a distinctive
US common law of war. At first blush, this approach resolves
some of the issues that plagued the CMCR's analysis. However,
appearances deceive.
304. Id. at 1284-86.
305. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJuly 15, 1999).
306. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 82-85 (2005) (discussing due process problems with the Joint
Criminal Enterprise doctrine, which in some tribunals has been read to require little in
the way of knowledge or intent by defendant).
307. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
178(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJuly 15, 1999).
308. Al Bahlul's case is closer, for reasons discussed infra notes 392-94 and
accompanying text.
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2. The Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the US Common
Law of War
Before the D.C. Circuit, the government has shifted the
Define and Punish Clause to the back burner, and relied
principally on the new argument that, regardless of the
international law of war, the "US common law of war"
authorizes trial of material support in military commissions.30
The "U.S. common law of war" argument does not rely on the
Define and Punish Clause, with its reference to the law of
nations, but instead relies on Congress's power under Article I,
section 8 to "make rules" for the army and navy, as well as other
textual anchors of Congress's authority over making war.
Unfortunately, the US common law of war argument does not fit
the Framers' constitutional design or most American practice,
which largely reflect the membership view.
The Framers, with their deep understanding of publicists
like Vattel, would have deplored assertions of a "U.S. common
law of war."310 Hamilton had argued in Rutgers v. Waddington
that the law of nations had to inform state law.3 1' He and
Madison, with their memories of attacks on ambassadors and
states' failure to observe treaties during the Articles of
Confederation period, had pressed for a Constitution to signal
the United States' allegiance to international law.312 They and
their fellow Framers would have found the notion of a "U.S.
common law of war" distressingly familiar; that same notion,
when articulated by the states during the Articles of
Confederation period, had crystallized the case for a new
Constitution.
As evidence from the Founding Era and beyond suggests,
both the text and purpose of the Define and Punish Clause show
that it was supposed to be the exclusive source for Congress'
309. See Hamdan Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 24-46. The Court of
Military Commission review ("CMCR") had rejected this broader argument. United
States v. al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1171 (asserting that the government lacked
power to determine military commission jurisdiction "without ... reference to
international norms").
310. Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Military Commissions: A Place Outside the Law's
Reach, 46 ST. Louis L.J. 1115,1143 (2012) (noting that the Framers "viewed the 'Law of
Nations' as a real body of law that was international in character").
311. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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power to authorize military commission trials of individuals
without a duty of loyalty to the United States. The government's
argument in Hamdan and Bahlul that Congress can invoke its
war powers to do an end run around the Define and Punish
Clause undermines that framework. Randolph, in his capacity as
Attorney General, noted that when dealing with foreign
nationals, "every change [in the law of nations] is at the peril of
the nation which makes it."313 Randolph did not merely add this
observation in the spirit of prudence; the tone of his opinion
indicated that he was analyzing the legal boundaries of the
government's power.
Invoking Congress's war powers to achieve a result that was
materially different from the one permitted under the Define
and Punish Clause would clearly have been viewed by Randolph
as a substantial "modification"3 14 which the Constitution barred.
Attorney General Speed's opinion in 1865 grounds similar
sentiments in the text of the Clause. Speed, as we have seen,
made much of the distinction between the term, "define" which
gives the Clause its name, and the Framers' use of the term
"make" in establishing Congress' power to regulate the armed
forces.31-5 While Randolph and Speed conceded that Congress
had some latitude in its work when it invoked the Define and
Punish Clause, they both viewed such latitude as circumscribed
compared with Congress' expansive war powers. Permitting war
powers to expand Congress' discretion under the Define and
Punish Clause would make these linguistic differences
superfluous, and risk the confrontations with foreign powers
that the Framers wished to avoid.316
Modem precedent reinforces this view. In Ex parte Quirin,
the Supreme Court first catalogued the various sources of
Congress's and the President's power over armed conflict, but
then pivoted to a closer focus on the Define and Punish
Clause.317 . Congress, according to the Court, has always viewed
313. Who Privileged from Arrest, supra note 13.
314. See id.
315. Military Commission, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, at *2 (1865)
316. Cf Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials for Violations of
International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 427, 471-72 (2009) (arguing that military
commissions that are perceived as illegitimate impair global counterterrorism efforts).
317. ExParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 10-12,26-29 (1942).
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the law of war as "part of the law of nations."-18 The
empowerment of military commissions to try "offenders . .
. against the law of war" thus stemmed directly from Congress'
power under the Define and Punish Clause.m In In re
Yamashita,32 o the Court reinforced this understanding, noting
that in the Articles of War Congress pursuant to the Define and
Punish Clause "incorporated . . . by reference" 2' the law of
war. 22 This body of law, the Court noted, included the "system
of military common law . . . deemed applicable by courts." 28
Stressing the jurisprudence's international pedigree, the Court
observed that the law of war also included international
agreements such as the Hague Convention. 24 Since the Hague
Convention imposed new restraints on states in conducting
warfare, 2-5 this passage recognized that United States practice
regarding the law of war was authoritative not in its own right,
but only as it informed interpretation of the "law of nations."
Hamdan's rejection of military commissions unilaterally
established by the executive branch and its finding that
Congress had incorporated the Geneva Convention's Common
Article 3 supports this ongoing consensus, as does the
conspiracy section ofJustice Stevens' opinion."2
Despite the government's claims, executive branch practice
largely adheres to the Framers' design. The Civil War military
commission convictions typically rested on individuals'
participation in specific acts of violence or breach of a duty of
allegiance to the United States. 27 The Nuremberg prosecutors'
careful tailoring of membership offenses also dovetails with the
Framers' scheme, not with the government's wholesale
reinterpretation.
318. Id. at 11.
319. Id.
320. In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
321. Id. at 7-8.
322. But see Comment, Haridimos v. Thravalos, The Military Commission in the War
on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REv. 737, 739 (2006) (taking broader view of presidential
authority to establish military commissions and suggesting that Yamashita signaled
movement away from sole reliance on the Define and Punish Clause).
323. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8.
324. Id.
325. See Schmitt, supra note 47, at 800; Watkin, supra note 52, at 21.
326. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95, 629-32 (2006).
327. Id. at 609.
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Skepticism is also warranted by the government's reliance
on Jackson's commission for Arbuthnot.328 As we have observed,
that episode attracted virulent criticism at the time, and seems
unmoored to any remotely credible proof of concrete
involvement with acts of violence. Arbuthnot's conviction and
execution may have fit Jackson's desire to place an exclamation
point at the close of his warning to the British to give up any
lingering ambitions on the Southeastern United States.
However, Congress's rejection of efforts to censure Jackson 29
does not establish a precedent that would authorize similar
moves. Moreover, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams'
correspondence supporting Jackson's decision relied on
international law, not on a distinctive United States body of
authority. If Adams was highly selective in his account of the
evidence in the case, those flaws should diminish respect for his
analysis, not discredit the role of international law.
3. The Categorical View of Military Commission Jurisdiction
While the government's US common law of war theory is an
end-run around international law, champions of the categorical
approach suffer from the opposite flaw: a rigid and arbitrary
account of the law of nations. States either accept this parched
account of international law or act lawlessly.3  That stark
position ignores the flexibility built into both international law
and the jurisprudence of the Define and Punish Clause.
For categorical theorists, determining the scope of
Congress's power under the Define and Punish Clause is just a
matching game. If international bodies have endorsed
prosecution of an offense with the same name as the offence
that Congress wishes to punish, Congress has acted within its
authority. However, if the offence carries a different name,
Congress has exceeded its power, even if Congress intends to
punish the same conduct that international bodies have
328. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 590.
329. Id. at 291.
330. See Kevin Jon Heller, Heller Responds to Margulies on the CMCR Decision in Al-
Bahbu4 LAWFARE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/heller-
responds-to-margulies-on-the-cmcr-decision-in-al-bahlul (arguing that viability of
charges under customary international law is categorical question, not fact-specific).
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addressed.31 In the first test of the government's theory, the
D.C. Circuit pushed back by adopting the categorical approach.
Judge Kavanaugh's opinion for the court in Hamdan II
rejected the US common law of war theory, noting correctly that
the US could inform, but not displace, the law of nations, at
least if it wished to permit the MCA 2006 to apply retroactively.
In assessing whether material support was a crime under the law
of nations, Judge Kavanaugh looked to treaties, case law, and
commentary. He observed that no treaty listed material support
as a crime punishable by a transnational tribunal.3
Furthermore, no tribunal had convicted anyone of the offence,
or even entertained charges. Commentators, the judge
continued, also typically declared that material support was not
a recognized war crime prior to the MCA's passage. Material
support might overlap in some cases with aiding and abetting
charges, Judge Kavanaugh acknowledged."33 However, he noted,
the elements of material support differed from the better-
established offence of aiding and abetting. If the government
believed that Hamdan was guilty of aiding and abetting, it
should have charged him accordingly, the panel concluded." 4
While the Hamdan II panel reached the right result in
vacating Hamdan's conviction, its rationale was unduly rigid.
Appreciating that point requires a wider perspective on the flaws
of the categorical approach. It also requires analysis of the flaws
in the Hamdan Ilpanel's opinion.
331. See, e.g., David Glazier, Playing By the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Larw
of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1033 (2009) (asserting that there is "no known
precedent... for considering the provision of material support to terrorism to
constitute a law of war violation"); Alexander, supra note 310, at 1143-44 (same); Dana
M. Hollywood, Redemption Deferred: Military Commissions in the War on Terror and the
Charge of Providing Material Support for Terrorism, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1
(2013) (same).
332. See Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Responding to the
Hamdan H1 decision, Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, chief prosecutor of the military
commissions system, recently dropped stand-alone conspiracy charges pending against
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four others accused of complicity in the 9/11 attacks.
See Charlie Savage, U.S. to Press Fight of Detainee's Appeal N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2013, at
A14. This was a sound tactical decision, given Gen. Martins' assessment of the strength
of the remaining charges. Id.
333. Id. at 37.
334. Id. at 37-38.
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Consider first the question of notice. As Madison noted in
Federalist No. 37335 and as Justice Story echoed in United States v.
Smith,"" international law has long resisted codification.
However, most tribunals have regarded this inhospitality to
codification as consistent with a more flexible definition of
notice. Tribunals from Nuremberg to the ICTY have tried and
punished defendants based on doctrines, including membership
offenses, JCE, and treating aggression as a war crime, which were
not codified at the time of the alleged offenses.337 The long
pedigree of offences such as abuse of captives or perfidy
provides adequate notice to any reasonable individual that
certain conduct will be regarded as a violation of the law of war.
Spies typically understand, for example, that their conduct
carries with it exposure to harsh sanctions.38 Similarly, history
provides little doubt of the consequences that ensue from
assisting in the killing of civilians or acting as a principal in an
organization engaged in such killing.339
Champions of the categorical view are correct that notice is
inadequate for trial in military commissions of the full range of
material support charges that can be prosecuted in ordinary
courts.34 0 An individual who actually read the Nuremberg
335. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 229 (James Madison).
336. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 159 (1820).
337. See David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law 16-22 (Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1154117,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154177 (analyzing issue and defending
adequacy of notice in prosecutions of crimes against humanity).
338. Cf TAYLOR, supra note 259, at 8 (noting ubiquity of "capital punishment for
spies").
339. See Beth van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of
Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 125-33 (2008) (discussing Nuremberg precedents);
id. at 133-41 (discussing more recent tribunals, including the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). But see Kevin Jon Heller, A Poisoned Chalice: The
Substantive and Procedural Defects of the Iraqi High Tribunal, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
261, 264-68 (2006) (asserting that tribunal trying Saddam Hussein for conduct in the
early 1990's had violated principles of notice); cf MICHAEL A. NEWrON & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 181-
83 (2008) (defending Iraqi tribunal).
340. For a general discussion of the role of material support, see Jens David
Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAw AND MORALITY IN AN
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 60, 69 (Claire Finkelstein et al., eds., 2012) [hereinafter Ohlin,
Targeting Co-Belligerents] (considering whether financial assistance that would constitute
material support under federal criminal law is "direct participation in hostilities" that
would justify targeting individual with lethal force); cf George P. Fletcher, Hamdan
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decisions on membership offenses could not reasonably predict
that modest cash or in-kind contributions to Al Qaeda would
give rise to a trial before a military commission. However, notice
is adequate for prosecution of material support charges better
tailored to the history and traditions of the law of war. Material
support charges tailored to aiding and abetting, for example,
would not present notice problems, since aiding and abetting
has long been an offence under the law of war. As we shall see in
the final sections of this Article, courts and other tribunals have
long tailored both criminal charges and civil causes of action to
international and constitutional norms. Tailoring material
support fits well with this tradition.
The categorical view also overstates the restrictive effect of
precedent on Congress's power. The Supreme Court has struck
down legislation enacted pursuant to the Define and Punish
Clause in only one case: United States v. Furlong. Furlong dealt
with an extreme set of facts - a murder of a foreign national by
another foreign national on the high seas aboard a non-United
States vessel. That extreme set of facts should not govern cases
involving conduct, such as the murder of civilians in armed
conflict, that international law clearly prohibits.
Second, Furlong has long been called a "strange" case
because of its secondary rationale.34' In explaining why murder
was not punishable under the law of nations while piracy was,
the Court asserted that murder was more heinous, and therefore
demanded application of a state's municipal law.342 However,
Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427, 441-47
(2007) (discussing whether material support and conspiracy are war crimes). The
Hamdan II panel addressed this issue by interpreting the Military Commissions Act of
2006 to bar retroactive application of the provision authorizing trial of material support
charges. See Hamdan II, 696 F.3d at 1247-48. Judge Kavanaugh justified this approach
by invoking the canon that courts should strive to interpret statutes to avoid serious
constitutional issues. Id. However, Judge Kavanaugh failed to explain why this
interpretation was preferable to tailoring material support charges in military
commissions to those that could also be framed as aiding and abetting. Cf infra notes
374-92 and accompanying text (discussing tailoring). Since international agreements,
case law, and commentators have recognized this more limited set of offenses as triable
in international tribunals, tailoring would also satisfy the avoidance canon, while doing
less violence to Congress's comprehensive framework.
341. See Helfman, supra note 100.
342. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1820) (asserting that
murder is an "offence too abhorrent to the feelings of man, to [be] ... brought
within . . . universal jurisdiction").
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this rationale does not square with the evolving understanding
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such crimes are
punishable by international tribunals precisely because they are
viewed as especially heinous.343 Furlong's logic swims against the
current of modern international law.
The Hamdan II decision also fails to adequately account for
the Supreme Court's decision in Quirin. Judge Kavanaugh's
opinion reads Quifin both too narrowly and too broadly. Judge
Kavanaugh failed to acknowledge Quirin's deference to the
political branches on the contours of offences triable in military
commissions. As noted, the Quirin Court treated espionage as a
violation of the law of nations, even though espionage is more
accurately described as an offense under a state's own law for
which the law of nations has traditionally authorized
punishment. The expansive view of espionage, along with the
Quirin Court's view that the crime of sabotage did not require a
completed act or even an attempt, could have passed muster
only if the Court accorded Congress a measure of deference.3 "
The Hamdan II panel declined to accord comparable deference
to the definitions in the MCA, but failed to explain how its
refusal squared with Quirin.
Curiously, the Hamdan II panel also read Quirin too
broadly. Judge Kavanaugh's opinion described Quirin as holding
that Congress could provide for the military commission trial of
"unlawful enemy combatants,"3 45 and Quirin contains language
to support this characterization.34 6 However, as I explain later in
this Article, defining mere unlawful combatancy as a war crime
was problematic at the time Quirin was decided, and is even
more problematic today.347 Unlawful combatancy, without more,
refers to a fighter's failure to wear a uniform or other identifying
insignia. However, this failure, without an additional concrete
act such as killing civilians, did not constitute a war crime in
1942 and does not amount to a war crime now. Congress lacked
the power under the Define and Punish Clause to make
343. Cf Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy, supra note 231 (explaining and
critiquing development of international law).
344. See supra notes 254-62 and accompanying text.
345. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1243 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
346. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
347. See infra notes 392-99 and accompanying text.
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unlawful combatancy a war crime, since this classification would
have entailed substantially rewriting the law of nations. Only a
standard far more deferential than the one articulated by the
Hamdan II panel could support this result. However, here, too,
the panel failed to explain the inconsistency between its
approach and its handling of Quinn.
The categorical approach has another, fundamental flaw,
which also seems curious given the generally conservative tenor
of previous opinions by the members of the Hamdan II panel. *
In pondering the perils of the short-term impulses that the
Define and Punish Clause seeks to tame, categorical theorists
are notably one-sided. Champions of the categorical view excel
at spotting the perils presented by states' overzealous
enforcement. However, they are often less perceptive about the
risks posed by non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Vattel
recognized centuries ago that non-state actors operating without
the state's mediating institutions could be exceedingly
"dangerous."-4 9 The Framers shared this insight.o50  They
realized, as the categorical theorists sometimes fail to, that the
community of nations rests on control of both government and
non-state actor overreaching. Judge Kavanaugh's previous
opinions evinced a thorough understanding of the dangers of
violent non-state actors. Indeed, some argued that an opinion
cited in Hamdan II went too far in this direction, asserting that
detention of suspected terrorists was not governed by
international law.35 1 While Judge Kavanaugh rightly recognized
in Hamdan II that the language of the Define and Punish Clause
required attention to international law, that turn should also
have encompassed appreciation for the dangers of violent non-
state actors, which the Framers shared with publicists like Vattel.
A tailored definition of material support could reconcile these
348. See, e.g., al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 9-23 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (asserting, despite government's
argument to the contrary, that international law of armed conflict did not circumscribe
executive's authority to detain persons who were part of Al Qaeda or associated forces).
349. VATTEL, supra note 11, available at http://www.matrixfiles.com/LoN.pdf.
350. See, e.g., THE FEDERALISr No. 3, supra note 1, at 44 (John Jay) (warning about
hostilities that caused "the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants" when individual
states were "unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses" against Native
American nations).
351. See al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 9-23.
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values. However, that reconciliation would have entailed an
analysis more nuanced than the Hamdan II panel's categorical
approach.
V. THE MEMBERSHIP CONCEPTION AND MATERIAL
SUPPORT
If the US common law of war argument and the categorical
approach fall short, the membership conception may do better
at addressing the challenges of trying suspected terrorists after
September 11. Since only some of the wide range of acts that
could be charged as material support in an ordinary civilian
court are consistent with military commission jurisdiction, courts
applying the membership approach must tailor the material
support provision as the Nuremberg prosecutors did with
membership offenses, taking care to avoid amorphous charges
that are not analogous to traditional crimes under the law of
war. The result of that tailoring represents a modest extension
of the aiding and abetting liability that international law
currently accepts. That result should receive a measure of
deference, as the Framers, case law, and international law
contemplate.
A. Deference and Complementarity
We have already seen that the publicists, Framers, and
subsequent courts carved out a zone of deference for the state's
definition of its duties under international law. Factors
contributing to this measure of deference included the breadth
and dynamic nature of international law, 352 the particular needs
of each state and hazards of foreign factions, and the utility of
the separation of powers as a guarantor of core international
principles. The international law principle of complementarity
similarly provides a measure of deference, particularly where a
state's internal institutions have some indicia of independence.
The case for deference that was persuasive to the Framers
has if anything grown more compelling with time. Consider the
352. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 228-29 (James Madison); supra
notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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Framers' fear of foreign faction. In recent decades, the cardinal
example from the law of war is the passion of non-aligned
nations and those under the sway of the former Soviet Union for
proposed changes codified in Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Convention.353 These changes made it easier for violent
non-state actors to forsake uniforms and other insignia of
combatancy.354 Released from those rules, non-state actors such
as terrorist groups would have more readily mounted perfidious
attacks on civilians and government targets.355 While the United
States has declared that it recognizes other, less controversial
portions of Additional Protocol I as customary international
law,35 6 it has declined to ratify the entire agreement, and other
countries have only done so with express reservations.357
Suppose that the United States sought to use military
353. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
354. See id. § 44; cf Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a
World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 344-47 (2009) (discussing
political crosscurrents that contributed to enactment of Protocol I). But see Kim L.
Scheppele, The International Standardization of National Security Law, 4J. NAT'L SECURITY
L. & POL'Y 437, 451 (2010) (arguing that global counterterrorism measures permit
many states to camouflage their substandard governance as counterterrorism); Sudha
Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 ME. L. REV. 131, 153
(2010) (suggesting that policies in the United States, United Kingdom, and India invite
concerns about the effect of counterterrorism efforts on human rights). See generally
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 59 (2007) (critiquing incentive structure of nongovernmental groups
that critique foreign policy of Western powers); Kenneth Anderson, "Accountability" as
"Legitimacy": Global Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 841 (2011).
355. See Newton, supra note 354, at 344-47.
356. This is true, for example, of the principle of proportionality, which requires
that attackers avoid excessive collateral damage in achieving a military advantage. See
Additional Protocol I, supra note 353, at arts. 52, 57; Koh, supra note 55 (noting that US
views proportionality as binding international law when making targeting decisions); see
also Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419 (1987) (discussing the American view of Additional Protocol 1);
cf (discussing legal compliance encouraged by US military lawyers); Monica Hakimi, A
Functional Approach to Targeting and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REv. 1365, 1391-97 (2012)
(outlining an integrated approach to targeting and detention based on factors
including whether a less drastic alternative exists); Neomi Rao, Public Choice and
International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch is a "They,"Not an 'It", 96 MINN. L.
REV. 194,238-43 (2011).
357. See Newton, supra note 354, at 347-53.
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commissions to try terrorists who had targeted its personnel for
perfidious attacks. The text, purpose, and history of the Define
and Punish Clause would counsel deference to that decision,
not obeisance to the faction-driven changes in Additional
Protocol I.
International law has also traditionally provided some
measure of deference to state determinations. Consider the
principle of complementarity,38  which requires that
international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court
(ICC) intervene to prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes
against humanity only when national institutions have defaulted
on this duty.39 In considering a state's choices, some quantum
of deference is required. State officials will often understand the
political culture and needs of their polity in a way that exceeds
the ability of international actors parachuting in from abroad. *
In addition, encouraging national efforts gives states a stake in
the international order. Armed with this stake, states can build
robust internal capacities for vindicating the rule of law.361
Without such a stake, states will abandon the long-term
perspective that international law demands and revert to the
reign of short-term impulse.36 2
The case for deference is even stronger in the context of a
state's use of military commissions to try violent non-state actors.
In considering the deference due a state's efforts to investigate
crimes against humanity by its own officials, international law
balances the prerogatives of the state against the need to disrupt
the culture of impunity that often lingers around such crimes.363
358. I am indebted to Ashley Deeks for this example.
359. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl. 1 10, art. I, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (noting that ICC was established
as "complementary to national criminal jurisdictions").
360. See Tara Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389, 439 (2009) (noting that "local needs are
best appreciated by local actors").
361. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 148
(2007) (praising internal restorative justice mechanisms that promote a "forgiveness
process characterized by truth telling, redefinition of the identity of the former
belligerents, partial justice, and a call for a new relationship"); Jane E. Stromseth, The
International Criminal Court and justice on the Ground, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 436-37
(2011) (noting importance of enhancing internal capacities).
362. See Burke-White, supra note 31, at 67-68.
363. See Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and
Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 OAJudgment on Defence Appeal
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However, a state's use of military commissions to try individuals
for alleged violations of international law does not bolster the
culture of impunity. If anything, it combats this syndrome,
giving the state more remedies against violence. This deference
should not be absolute, since a state's profligate use of military
commissions can be just as oppressive as its failure to hold
officials accountable for past human rights violations. However,
a measure of deference in these instances serves the same
beneficial ends as the principle of complementarity, giving the
state a stake in engagement with international law.M
A post-September 11 innovation in the United Nations's
cooperation on terrorism strengthens the case for deference.
Shortly after September 11, the United Nations Security Council
put out a resolution requiring states to cooperate in worldwide
counterterrorism efforts.3 66 As both Congress and the
Challenging Admissibility of Case, 1 39-43 (Aug. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl223134.pdf (holding that ICC proceeding
would not violate principle of complementarity under Article 17(1) (a) of Rome Statute
when the state had failed to investigate an individual already charged by tribunal); see
also Michael A. Newton, The Quest for Constructive Complementarity 9 (Vanderbilt Univ.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-16, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585402 (arguing that Rome Statute "requires ... an
appropriate balance of authority between the supranational court and domestic
states"); cf Diane F. Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts"Revisited Reconciling Global Norms
with Local Agency, I INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUsT. 10 (2007) (discussing the balance
between deference to states and commitment to universal principles).
364. For other instances of deference in transnational tribunals, see Handyside v.
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 47 (1976) (granting a "margin of
appreciation" to state decision banning a book on sexuality marketed to teenagers); see
also Robert D. Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International
Law, and Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 975, 983 (2010) (allowing that the
"margin of appreciation" confers flexibility on sovereign states so that they may
"implement or interpret human rights in ways that may be sensitive or responsive to
prevailing social, cultural, and other norms within their polities"); Council of Europe
Comm. of Ministers, Brighton Declaration, High Level Conference on the Future of
the European Court of Human Rights, (19-20 April, 2012), available at
http://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declaration (noting that margin of appreciation
is vital because "national authorities are in principle better placed than an
international court to evaluate local needs and conditions"); cf M6nica Pinto, National
and International Courts-Deference or Disdain?, 30 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 247,
257-63 (2008) (noting that Inter-American Court of Human Rights does not rely on a
"margin of appreciation", but uses analogous "fourth instance" doctrine to limit
intrusion in domestic law).
365. SeeS.C. Res. 1373, l(d) U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (holding
that "states are required to prohibit anyone within their personal or territorial
jurisdiction from making any "funds, financial assets or economic resources . . .
76 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1
Humanitarian Law Project Court indicated, the complex task of
reducing the flow of resources to DFTOs entails global
cooperation. 66 While the Security Council did not expressly
authorize military commissions, its resolutions contemplate a
more robust role for domestic law enforcement. Appropriately
cabined military commissions can supplement domestic law
enforcement, providing an additional option when ordinary
civilian courts are inadequate or unavailable.367 A categorical
approach to military commission jurisdiction that precluded
resort to this option would clash with the spirit, if not the letter,
of Security Council measures. In contrast, granting states a
measure of discretion in shaping military commission
jurisdiction facilitates the state cooperation that is crucial to the
membership project against terrorism.
Congress should receive a measure of deference on the
nexus it designates between charges in military commissions and
conduct previously tried in such tribunals pursuant to
international law. While champions of the categorical approach
available . . . for the benefit of persons who ... commit . . . or participate in the
commission of terrorist acts"); cf Scheppele, supra note 354, at 440 (arguing that S.C.
Res. 1373 has provided pretext for antidemocratic crackdowns).
366. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (noting
importance of "cooperative efforts" and "international cooperation" for a successful
response to terrorism).
367. Cf Aziz Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1454-68
(2012) (arguing that availability of military commissions as additional option in
appropriate cases promotes more efficient process); Matthew C. Waxman,
Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. &
POL'Y 1, 17-23 (2009) (discussing different criteria for administrative detention).
Others have argued that establishing a national security court is a useful alternative to
both ordinary federal courts and military tribunals; Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith,
Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1079 (2008) (discussing relative advantages and overlapping principles in Article III
courts, detention, and military commissions);. See generally Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey
Rishikof, Due Process is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III
National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87 (2008).
368. Courts should accord even greater deference to a statute that operates
prospectively, raising none of the retroactivity problems that the Hamdan H1 panel
perceived in the Military Commission Act's inclusion of material support. See Hamdan
H, 696 F.3d at 1246 n. 6 (observing, in portion of opinion concurred in only by Judge
Kavanagh, that Congress has authority under war powers to prospectively allow material
support charges); but see United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 7 (11th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012),
at *21-35 (holding that Congress lacked power under Define and Punish Clause to
prospectively criminalize drug trafficking on vessels located in territorial waters of
other nations).
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argue that Congress should only be permitted to authorize trial
of charges that have been tried in military tribunals previously,
Congress may also elect to pursue the trial based on a functional
nexus. Under a functional approach, the specific conduct
charged should dovetail with conduct that earlier material
commissions have tried and punished.369 As long as the conduct
in each context overlaps, defendants have the notice that the law
of nations requires. As we shall see, a functional test will permit
material support charges that allege certain conduct linked to
unlawful violence, although it will bar charges alleging conduct
without such links.
B. Tailoring Material Support
While categorical theorists assert that a decision-maker
should look merely at the name of the offense to determine
whether it fits within Congress's power, neither international
nor domestic tribunals have taken this approach. Both
transnational and domestic tribunals have instead tailored
charges to the boundaries of conduct that may be punished
under the Constitution and international law.
In domestic courts, the interpretation of statutes in light of
the law of nations pre-dates the Constitution's enactment. The
Rutgers v. Waddington court followed international law and
interpreted New York's Trespass Act as protecting a British
merchant who had followed military orders, even though the
statute expressly precluded a military orders defense.370 After the
Constitution's enactment, Chief Justice Marshall's formulation
of the Charming Betsy canon tailored legislation that clashed
with international law.37' The Nuremberg prosecutors'
narrowing of membership offenses was also a species of
tailoring. Each parallels federal courts' avoidance, exhibited in
369. Cf Ohlin, supra note 340, at 86-87 (providing a functional definition of
membership in Al Qaeda that would justify targeting and detention).
370. See LAW PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 417; Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34
at 969-70. The blowback in the political realm from the court's decision was
considerable. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1663-1830, at
199-201 (2005) (discussing claims of the decision's critics that reliance on
international law was illegitimate).
371. See Wuerth, supra note 93.
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the recent healthcare decision, of statutory interpretations that
clash with constitutional requirements. 372 The clear line of
hermeneutic method from Hamilton to Marshall to health care
suggests that tailoring is a prudent hedge against the
"momentary inclination" to fray the fabric of constitutional and
international norms.? 3
C. Tailored Material Support and Aiding and Abetting Liability
A tailored version of material support charges would look
much like aiding and abetting. The accepted definition needs to
be more limber to accommodate some charges of material
support. However, the tailored definition would still preclude
the broadest uses of the federal criminal prohibition. Our
touchstone on aiding and abetting liability is the codification
effort by the International Law Commission (ILC). The ILC
noted that collective attributions of guilt were generally
inappropriate, and that conviction of crimes against humanity
such as the murder of civilians rested on "individual
responsibility." 374  The ILC recognized that individual
responsibility could include the actions of one who
"I[k]nowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and
372. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012)
(holding that the avoidance canon counseled construing the penalty imposed by
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 for individuals who fail to purchase
health insurance as a tax); see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957)
(avoiding "constitutional danger zone" of suppression of ideas through narrow reading
of statute that prohibited membership in organizations such as the Communist Party,
which advocated for forcible overthrow of the United States government). For more on
the avoidance doctrine, see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); cf ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING ILAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247-51 (2012) (praising
doctrine); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1550 (2000) (discussing rationale
for avoidance). But see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 71
(1996) (expressing skepticism about legitimacy and utility of doctrine).
373. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting
that the "independence of the judges is .. . requisite to guard the Constitution and the
rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which ... the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves").
374. See Report Of The International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth
Session, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with
commentaries, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (May 6-July 26, 1996) [hereinafter ILC Draft
Code].
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substantially, in the commission of ... a crime." 75 The
commentary to this section noted that the accomplice must
"knowingly provide . . . assistance which facilitates the
commission of a crime in some significant way."376
Aiding and abetting liability includes assistance after the
crime's commission, as long as the perpetrator and accomplice
agreed on this assistance before the fact.3" Assistance that a
perpetrator knows will be forthcoming upon commission of a
crime facilitates commission of the crime just as surely as direct
assistance before the fact. 78 Aiding after the fact is an in-kind
insurance policy, guaranteeing that the perpetrator will not face
obstacles that may well have dampened the perpetrator's ardor
for the entire operation.
Aiding and abetting liability covers many of the offenses
supposedly included in the "U.S. common law of war." 79 The
bridge-burning cases clearly fall under this rubric, with most
defendants convicted of conduct that entailed concrete
assistance to acts of violence against government targets.o80 The
bushwhacker cases often involved similar proof of violence
against civilian persons and/or property, in the context of units
so small that an individual who slacked off in engaging in such
conduct would receive substantial and immediate peer pressure
from his colleagues in crime.38'
The Nuremberg prosecutors' refinement of the London
Charter's "membership offenses" is also analogous to aiding and
abetting liability, albeit with somewhat greater play at the joints.
The bushwhacker scenario explains the conviction of the
noncommissioned officer Graf, who was part of the murderous
einsatzgruppen that engaged in face-to-face killing of hundreds of
375. Id. art. 2 1 3(d).
376. Id. art. 2 Commentary, I 11.
377. Id. art. 2 Commentary, 1 12.
378. See Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and
Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21
Harv. Hum Rts. J. 241, 271 (2008) (noting importance of perpetrator's knowledge
prior to crime's commission that he would receive help afterward).
379. See supra notes 309-29 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (describing how bridge-
burners were often complicit in acts against the government).
381. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (outlining the establishment of
commissions to prosecute bushwackers).
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thousands of civilians in Central and Eastern Europe.8 2
Although Graf was reluctant to continue in the unit - a fact that
reduced his sentence-it would be difficult for a
noncommissioned officer in such a unit to avoid conduct such
as assisting in transportation or logistics that facilitated the
einsatzgruppen's activities.
A later case arising out of the activities of the einsatzgruppen
is Public Prosecutor v. Menten,383 in which a Dutch court convicted
a translator of crimes against humanity in connection with the
killing of Jews, Polish nationalists, and suspected communists.
Although the trial occurred decades after the events in question
and evidence of the defendant's participation in actual killing
was slim, 384 the court found that Menten had assisted forces
engaged in killing through his services as a translator385 and his
"accurate knowledge of persons and places" in the area.386
Aiding and abetting also covers the conduct of the German
financiers and industrialists like Flick and Steinbrinck who
banded together as "Friends of Himmler" to assist the SS's
murderous mission.387 An efficient war crimes machine requires
care and feeding, and Flick and Steinbrinck provided the
resources that made that possible. The tribunal also found that
they contributed eagerly with full knowledge of the SS's lethal
activities.388
More recent cases have often involved leaders in armed
conflicts that resulted in the murder of civilians and rampant
382. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 264, at 587 (finding Graf guilty of
membership in the SD).
383. Public Prosecutor v. Menten, 75 I.L.R. 331 (Neth. Sup. Ct. 1981).
384. Id. at 345 (noting that defendant's joint responsibility was proven, although
his "exact part [in the killings] could not be precisely established after such a long
time").
385. Id. at 347.
386. See id. at 351, 360, 365 (discussing defendant's use of his skills to aid the
police and render "incidental services" to unit).
387. See See 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, at 1221 (1952) (finding that the
donation of money to Himmler, which in turn went to fund illegal activities, was
sufficient for conviction).
388. Id. at 1216, 1222-23 (noting that Flick and Steinbrinck were convicted of
having "knowledge of the criminal activities of the SS [and still] contribut[ing] funds
and influence to its support."
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sexual abuse of women. In Prosecutor v. Krstic,389 the ICTY
convicted a Serbian commander of aiding and abetting
genocide in connection with the killing of thousands of Bosnian
Muslim men. More recently, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
convicted the Liberian leader Charles Taylor of aiding and
abetting murder, mutilation, and sexual abuse in Sierra Leone
by providing arms and logistical support to groups that engaged
in such activity."90 The court defined aiding and abetting broadly
as lending "practical assistance, encouragement, or moral
support to the perpetration of a crime or underlying offence."39'
Although two of the recent cases involved leaders, nothing
in aiding and abetting liability restricts the class of defendants to
this small group. Small fish can also play a significant role,
depending on the nature of their conduct. Material support
charges that entail analogous types of assistance and knowledge
therefore build on a solid international law foundation.
Bringing material support within the aiding and abetting
fold would prompt a split decision in Hamdan II and al BahluL
Consider Hamdan's conviction first. As discussed above, the law
of nations spurs doubts about Hamdan's conviction, which
hinged neither on specific unlawful acts of violence nor on
performance of a substantial role in an organization dedicated
to such violence.392 The difficulty of shoehorning Hamdan's
conviction into one of these rubrics suggests that the outcome
may be difficult to uphold, even if courts ultimately reject the
categorical approach adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan II.
On the surface, it might be persuasive for the US to take a
different tack, arguing that Hamdan violated international law
as an "unprivileged belligerent" in Afghanistan. Hamdan had
not received the approval of Yemen, his country of origin, for
his activities. He arguably broke the neutrality norms enforced
by the US against its own nationals since Washington's
Neutrality Proclamation. One could analogize Hamdan, who did
389. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, judgment, 11 135-39, 144 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Apr. 19, 2004).
390. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSLA)M)1-T, Judgment, 6910-12 (Special
Court for Sierra Leone, May 18, 2012).
391. Id. 1482 (defining "aiding and abetting").
392. See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text (discussing facts in Hamdan's
case).
81
82 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
not wear a standard uniform, to the banditti whom Henry,
Adams, and Speed asserted could have been hung from the
nearest tree. However, this view would conflate the two levels of
generality that the Framers built into the Define and Punish
Clause.
At the time it was enacted, the Define and Punish Clause
embodied not merely the specific principles of the law of
nations in place during that period, but the future contours of
this body of law.393 The Framers recognized that these principles
were always evolving.394 Even more than the open-textured
constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality, the reference
to the law of nations in the Define and Punish Clause indicates
that the Framers drafted the Clause to reflect that evolution.
The Framers understood that while international law's fluidity
often defies codification, a definitive expression of international
sentiment can create new norms and modify old ones. As
Edmund Randolph hinted in his early discussion of the Define
and Punish Clause, the US can adhere to international law
principles that have encountered pushback from some parties,
but cannot exhume principles that the weight of international
opinion has buried.-95 Today, a definitive expression of
international opinion bars casting mere unprivileged
belligerency as a war crime. Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Convention allows hostile parties to a conflict to decline to wear
uniforms until the moment they are "engaged in a military
deployment preceding the launching of an attack."196 While the
US, which has not ratified Additional Protocol I, is entitled to
targeP97 and detain98 such fighters, a majority of nations reject
393. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 228 (James Madison).
394. Id.
395. Who Privileged from Arrest, supra note 13, at 28-29.
396. Additional Protocol I, supra note 353, art. 43, 13; see also Alexander, supra
note 310, at 1144 (criticizing unprivileged belligerency charges); Baxter, supra note
252; David J.R. Frakt, Direct Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime: America's Failed
Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 732-34 (2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103906; cf Newton, supra note 354 (critiquing provision);
Proposals for Reform Hearing, supra note 294 (testimony of David J.R. Frakt, Lead
Defense Counsel, Office of Military Commissions) (noting that three military
commissions in Guantanamo cases had rejected prosecution theories based on mere
unprivileged belligerency).
397. See BENJAMIN WrrrES, DETENTION AND DENIAL: THE CASE FOR CANDOR
(2011); Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
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trial of these fighters for war crimes absent direct involvement in
unlawful violence or the performance of a substantial role
within such an organization. US practice, exemplified in Quinin,
has treated mere unprivileged belligerency as a war crime, but
only in conjunction with other concrete acts, such as espionage
and sabotage, 99 which the government did not allege that
Hamdan had committed. Hamdan's arms sales might qualify as
trading with the enemy, but only if he had owed a duty of loyalty
to the US or had traded weapons during the US occupation.
Since these factors do not fit Hamdan, a Yemeni national who
was captured during the initial fighting in Afghanistan after
September 11, the law of nations as presently constituted
deprives military commissions ofjurisdiction.
Al Bahlul's conduct is a closer call. Since al Bahlul engaged
in after-the-fact distribution of martyr's wills for two of the
September 11 hijackers,400 his acts provide a closer nexus with a
specific Al Qaeda operation that targeted civilians. Moreover,
the attackers and al Bahlul's superior, Osama bin Laden, viewed
the propaganda advantage reaped by September 11 as a central
rationale for the attacks themselves. This supplies the before-the-
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2011)
(analyzing issues around the US targeting and use of lethal force against al-Awlaki);
Hakimi, supra note 356.
398. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REv. 769 (2011); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in
Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 53-55 (2009) (describing the types of persons
who may be detained).
399. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1942).
400. Al Bahlul acknowledged that he "'typed' or 'transcribed'" martyr's wills after
the attacks. See Brief of Petitioner at 7, al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 9, 2012). Al Bahlul has claimed that he was at home in Yemen, not with bin
Laden, when the wills were first drafted and read on tape by the hijackers, thus
precluding any before-the-fact role. See id. at 7-8; see also Transcript of Military
Commission Hearing at 193-94, United States v. al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (Ct.
Mil. Comm'n Rev. 2011) ( No. CMCR 09-001), available at http://www.mc.mil/cases/
militarycommissions.aspx (hereinafter al Bahlul Transcript) (recounting testimony of
defendant that he "did not have the honor" of initially drafting or filming martyr's
wills). The Court of Military Commission Review took a somewhat broader view of al
Bahlul's role, describing him as having "prepared... 'martyr wills' to motivate
[hijackers] . .. to commit the 9/11 attacks." See United States v. al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp.
2d 1141, 1162 (Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. 2011).
84 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
fact agreement that the ILC demands. 1* In addition, al Bahlul's
role as a media adviser to bin Laden placed him near the center
of Al Qaeda policy.* 2 This moves al Bahlul's case closer to those
of the "Friends of Himmler," Steinbrinck and Flick, who
knowingly provided substantial financial support and
encouragement to the SS chief and fit the tailored version of
membership offenses advanced by American prosecutors at
Nuremberg. A similarly tailored version of material support
would sustain al Bahlul's conviction.
D. Conspiracy After Hamdan H
Even if one agrees with the Hamdan II panel that material
support isn't a violation of the law of nations, the future of
conspiracy charges in military commissions may be brighter.
True, there are significant problems with conspiracy, either as a
mode of liability requiring a completed crime (the view in
France and other civil law countries) or as a separate offense
requiring only an agreement and some overt act furthering the
agreement (the view under ordinary US criminal law). That said,
conspiracy is a plausible mode of liability in military commission
cases, including al BahluL However, international law and
practice dim the prospects for charging conspiracy as a separate
and independent offense.
Applying the Hamdan II analysis, conspiracy's main edge
over material support is its pedigree in international treaties,
case law, and commentary. The lack of this pedigree was fatal to
401. Cf Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and
Counterterrorism Strategy, 32 INT'L SECURrlY 78, 85-86 (2008) (discussing terrorists'
incentives).
402. For precedents holding propagandists liable, see TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 548 (1948) [hereinafter
IMT Trials] (convicting Nazi propagandistJulius Streicher, who had "injected [poison]
... into the minds of thousands of Germans ... [and] caused them to follow the
National Socialist policy ofJewish persecution and extermination"); see also Prosecutor
v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Summary of Judgement (Nov. 28, 2007)
(affirming convictions of a number of defendants who owned or operated media
outlets for incitement and instigation of genocide in Rwanda, while vacating other
convictions). But see IMT Trials, supra, at 584-85 (acquitting a more junior
propagandist, Hans Fritzsche, due to findings that his acts were ministerial in nature
and speeches he wrote "did not urge persecution or extermination ofJews"); TAYLOR,
supra note 259, at 461 (noting that Fritzsche's "influence on policy was only
interstitial").
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material support in Judge Kavanaugh's Hamdan II opinion.**
Conspiracy's lineage is more substantial.
First consider the pedigree of conspiracy as a mode of
liability. Analysis begins with the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes
Against Peace and Security of Mankind.404 Article 2(e) of the
Draft Code prohibits "planning or conspiring" to engage in war
crimes, such as targeting civilians, that "in fact occur." The ILC
Draft Code's standing provides some evidence of conspiracy's
acceptance, of the kind that the Hamdan II panel found lacking
in the case of material support. Conspiracy as mode of liability,
however, encounters problems elsewhere in the indicia of
legitimacy that Judge Kavanaugh outlined in his opinion for the
court. The London Charter governing the Nuremberg tribunals
expressly provided for conspiracy, and the Nuremberg tribunals
permitted such charges, albeit in a limited manner."5 The
statutes of more recent tribunals, such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), are more
restrictive. They do not include conspiracy as a mode of liability,
although they do allow charging conspiracy to commit genocide
(and genocide only) as a separate offense." 6 Whether this is an
insurmountable obstacle depends on how one reads Judge
Kavanaugh's opinion.
If one reads the indicia of authority in the opinion as
conjunctive, conspiracy as mode of liability is problematic. On
this view, the failure to include conspiracy as a mode of liability
in the statutes of the ICTY and other recent tribunals would be
fatal. However, one can also read Judge Kavanaugh's discussion
as a more flexible guide to the range of authority that could
support military commission jurisdiction. On this more flexible
view, the ILC's endorsement of conspiracy would still be
403. See Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, (D.C. Cir. 2012).
404. See ILC Draft Code, supra note 374.
405. See London Agreement of 8 August 1945, Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, and the Nuremberg Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, reprinted in 2
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 675-91 (1995); Jens David Ohlin,
joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 693, 702 (2011)
[hereinafter Ohlin, joint Intentions].
406. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
art. 4(3) (b), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
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meaningful, along with conspiracy's inclusion in the London
Charter of the Nuremberg tribunals.
This pedigree also creates room for the analogical
reasoning thatJudge Kavanaugh rejected in the case of material
support. As Cornell's Jens David Ohlin mentions in an
important recent article,40 conspiracy as a mode of liability
shares many attributes with another mode of liability involving
concerted activity, Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), which is
included in the statutes of recent tribunals and figures heavily in
the case law. For example, Article 25(3) (d) of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court permits the conviction of an
person who "contributes to the commission... of... a crime by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose."40 This
pairing ofjoint intention with action is very close to conspiracy -
close enough that no individual charged with the latter as a
mode of liability can claim lack of notice.
Consider how this plays out in the case of bin Laden's
propagandist, al Bahlul. Al Bahlul was convicted of both
material support and conspiracy under the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which authorizes conspiracy as both a
mode of liability and a separate offence. Al Bahlul, as an aide to
bin Laden, was obviously below bin Laden's pay grade, and it's
unclear whether he had advance, specific knowledge of the 9/11
attacks. However, he clearly contributed to the attacks before
and after the fact. Evidence includes al Bahlul's closeness to the
Al Qaeda leader, knowledge of earlier attacks on civilians such
as the East Africa embassy bombings, admitted administration of
the bayat or loyalty oath to two of the 9/11 hijackers including
ringleader Muhammed Atta,"4 1 and acknowledgment that after
the attacks he distributed his two prot6g6s' martyr's wills
justifying their role. Al Bahlul's contributions to the attacks
through administration of the bayat and distribution of the
martyr's wills meet the requirements for JCE, and should
407. See Ohlin, Joint Intentions, supra note 405.
408. See Rome Statute, supra note 359, art. 25(3) (d).
409. See Brief for Respondent at 9-10, Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324
(D.C. Cir. May 16, 2012) (hereinafter al Bahlul, Brief for Respondent) (summarizing
evidence at trial).
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therefore also fit under the rubric of conspiracy as a mode of
liability.410
The viability of conspiracy to commit war crimes as a
separate offence is a tougher question. Here, too, conspiracy
crosses Judge Kavanaugh's first threshold, since a range of
treaties mention it. For example, Article 6 of the London
Charter that governed the International Military Tribunal (IMT)
at Nuremberg permitted charges of "conspiracy for the
accomplishment of" crimes against peace. These crimes
included aggressive war and war in violation of treaties.
However, the specific definitions of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, which followed the definition of crimes
against peace in the Charter, did not include conspiracy
language. When Justice Robert Jackson, the head Nuremberg
prosecutor, submitted indictments that also charged conspiracy
to commit war crimes, the IMT swatted away Jackson's attempt,
ruling that it lacked jurisdiction.'
Current treaties, statutes, and tribunals track this pattern.
The Genocide Convention makes conspiracy a stand-alone
offence. Because of the Convention's inclusion of conspiracy,
the statutes of tribunals such as the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also permit charging
conspiracy to commit genocide as a stand-alone crime. 412
However, as Cornell's Ohlin notes, these tribunals have
repeatedly expressed skepticism about conspiracy, perhaps
because of long-standing worries in civil law systems about the
410. Al Bahlul's trial gave rise to another problem related to the distinction
between conspiracy as mode of liability and separate offense. The military jury in the
case made findings regarding conspiracy as a separate offense, but did not make
findings regarding conspiracy as a mode of liability. In other words, it found an
agreement, but not a completed underlying act such as the murder of civilians.
However, al Bahlul's own testimony conceded that the 9/11 attacks had occurred. See al
Bahlul Transcript, supra note 400, at 193-94 (asserting that his stay in Yemen precluded
his having "honor" of videotaping martyr's wills of hijackers). Al Bahlul litigated his
case as if he was being charged with conspiracy as a mode of liability based on the 9/11
attacks. The militaryjury found that he had committed acts relating to the 9/11 attacks,
including administering the oath of allegiance to two of the 9/11 hijackers and
"preparing" their martyr's wills. See al Bahlul Respondent Brief for Respondent, supra
note 409, at 13, 16. Therefore, treating the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks as an
undisputed fact would not result in prejudice.
411. See Bush, supra note 259, at 1162.
412. See Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2(3)(b),
Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1498.
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vagueness such charges might yield. Moreover, no treaty permits
charging conspiracy to commit war crimes, such as targeting
civilians, as an independent offence. The Military Commissions
Act of 2006 is thus an outlier in this regard.
One can argue that the inclusion of conspiracy for
genocide but not war crimes is a function of pragmatism, not
principle. Genocide may be a crime of unique dimensions, but
that does not justify rejecting the added deterrence that stand-
alone conspiracy charges might yield for other serious crimes,
such as mass killing of civilians that falls just short of genocide.
However, the argument that international law should treat war
crimes and genocide equally echoes the natural law concepts
that dominated international law until the nineteenth century.
This period saw the gradual eclipse of "naturalist" principles in
international law and the ascendancy of positivism - what the
law is, not what it should be."' Moreover, the failure to include
conspiracy to commit war crimes as a separate offence in treaties
and case law raises the concerns about retroactive application
and the Ex Post Facto Clause that Judge Kavanaugh stressed in
Hamdan II. If a trained lawyer assessing the relevant authorities
would not anticipate this charge, a lay defendant would not
either. That makes lack of notice a problem of constitutional
scale.
Evidence from US history is does not trump the positivist
trend or provide the notice otherwise lacking. First, as Judge
Kavanaugh rightly noted, under the Constitution's Define and
Punish Clause, there is no distinct "U.S. common law of war"
that trumps international law. Second, the United States
Supreme Court endorsed the positivist trend in The Antelope, in
which Chief Justice Marshall explained that slavery was not yet a
violation of customary international law, although he readily
acknowledged that it might become one.414 Third, it is true that
the United States has a history of filing conspiracy charges in
military commissions, as plotters of Lincoln's assassination
discovered. However, as Justice Stevens noted in Hamdan I, most
conspiracy charges entailed completed crimes. This history
413. See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUTIY AND CHANGE, supra
note 198, at 55, 62-65.
414. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 121-22 (1825).
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suggests the United States, like Europe, did not develop what
Madison in Federalist No. 37 called a "course of practice" in
charging conspiracy to commit war crimes as an independent
offence.
Viewed in this light, conspiracy after Hamdan II requires
careful tailoring. Military commissions do not have jurisdiction
over conspiracy as a separate offence. They should, however,
have jurisdiction over conspiracy as a mode of liability.
CONCLUSION
Tailoring of both conspiracy and material support charges
is consistent with the membership conception that the publicists
and Framers embraced. Publicists like Vattel and Pufendorf
viewed membership in the community of nations as valuable
precisely because it remedied the effects of short-term impulses.
The publicists also envisioned institutional arrangements, like
separation of powers, which would resist impulse's rule and
facilitate reflection. The Framers refined these sentiments,
seconding Hamilton's claim that embracing the guidance of
international law was a test of "national character."415
The enactment of the Define and Punish Clause was a
crucial manifestation of the membership conception. In drafting
the clause, the Framers had two goals. They sought to signal to
the community of nations that the new Republic would live by
the same rules as other states. These rules, as the Framers
defined them, included the procedural safeguards that
Randolph extolled in his debate with Patrick Henry on the
propriety of summary execution. At the same time, the Framers
were worried about factions from abroad exerting undue
influence and prompting volatility in the sometimes amorphous
elements of the law of nations that Madison warned about in
Federalist No. 37. The Define and Punish Clause's delegation to
Congress sought to comply with international law while
preserving a zone of deference to combat individuals and
entities who threatened global cooperation.
American practice from the Founding Era to the present
largely tracks the membership conception. As the first Attorney
415. LAw PRActiCE, supra note 12, at 393.
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General, Randolph affirmed the Define and Punish Clause's
limits on congressional power. However, the perils of foreign
influence during this period, manifested in controversies over
neutrality and the Jay Treaty, suggested the need for a space
where the new nation could accommodate international law to
its own needs. Judicial tailoring could supply the reflection that
the political branches sometimes lacked, as Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in the Charming Betsy case showed. The
piracy and counterfeiting contexts also displayed deference to
congressional determinations of danger to the United States,
although United States v. Furlong indicated that cases of
wrongdoing without clear links to the United States would
encounter special scrutiny. Tailoring also played an important
role in the Civil War military commissions, where executive
review - sometimes by Lincoln himself - helped assure that most
verdicts involved direct participation in violence or breaches of
citizens' duty of loyalty. The outlier in this narrative was
Jackson's military commission for Arbuthnot, which relied on
questionable evidence presented without procedural safeguards.
Jackson's legendary vindictiveness aside, American practice
has continued to echo the membership conception. During
World War II, Quirin upheld prosecution on espionage and
sabotage charges, whose long pedigree in military commissions
provided the notice that fairness required. Addressing due
process concerns, American prosecutors at Nuremberg
dramatically scaled down membership offenses, focusing on acts
of violence or substantial roles in organizations that promoted
such acts. The plurality opinion on conspiracy by Justice Stevens
in the Supreme Court's 2006 Hamdan decision stressed the
separation of powers, noting that President Bush's unilateral
attempt to create military commissions embodied an impulse
toward tyranny that did not plague Congress's exercise of power
under the Define and Punish Clause. Yet Stevens' analysis of
conspiracy liability suggested that the Court would not be a
rubber stamp, even for Congress.
The consensus in American practice favoring the
membership conception encounters fresh challenges in
Congress's authorization of material support prosecutions in
military commissions. The breadth of the federal criminal law
statutes barring material support would permit military
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commissions trials based on alleged conduct, such as providing
nominal financial support or training in nonviolence to Al
Qaeda, even though such charges have not previously been
triable in this forum. To salvage the material support convictions
of both Salim Hamdan and Ali Hamza al Bahlul, the
government has turned to a novel theory which posits a "U.S.
common law of war." However, the government's answer
compounds the challenges posed by material support charges in
military commissions.
Positing a US common law of war turns the Framers'
careful design on its head. As we have seen, the Define and
Punish Clause was drafted to show that the new nation would
curb the violations of international law, such as attacks on
ambassadors and flouting of treaties, which plagued the Articles
of Confederation period. The Framers would have been baffled
by a theory that allowed Congress to by-pass this constraint.
The Framers would also have rejected the categorical
account of military commission jurisdiction that opposes the
government's position. That account seeks to reduce the vast
realms of international law to handy recipe cards noted by
Madison in Federalist No. 37. Under this rote approach, the
labels attached to charges mean everything, while the actual
conduct charged in military commissions means nothing. The
rigidity of the categorical approach does not fit the Framers'
pragmatic proclivities. Nor does it harmonize with the deference
accorded to states under the international law principle of
complementarity.
A membership conception would navigate between the
license sanctioned by the US common law of war position and
the categorical approach's rigidity. It would allow courts to tailor
the material support provisions in military commission
legislation. Tailoring would permit only charges that alleged
conduct functionally analogous to acts previously charged in
military commissions, such as direct participation in violence
against civilians or perfidious attacks, or performance of a
substantial role in an organization that coordinated such efforts.
Tailoring would permit charging conspiracy as a mode of
liability for completed acts of violence, but not as a separate
offense involving mere agreement. In this fashion, tailoring
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would grant Congress a measure of deference without giving it a
blank check.
Neither the government nor its categorical opponents will
get everything they want from the functional approach to
material support charges. Hamdan's conviction for generic
service as a foot soldier will fall. However, the functional
approach would uphold al Bahlul's conviction for his after-the-
fact distribution of the 9/11 attackers' martyr's wills and his role
as bin Laden's personal propagandist. A split decision empowers
Congress to regulate unlawful violence while blunting the short-
term impulses that the Framers feared. This careful balance
keeps faith with the contending values that the Framers built
into the Define and Punish Clause.
